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Do Equilibrium Real Business Cycle
Theories Explain Postwar U. S.
Business Cycles?
1. Introduction
During the past decade there has been a resurgence of interest in equi-
librium real business cycle theories. According to these theories, the
recurrent fluctuation in outputs, consumptions, investments, and other
real quantities—what we shall refer to as the business cycle phenome-
non—is precisely what one should expect to emerge from industrial
market economies in which consumers and finns solve intertemporal
optimum problems under uncertainty. Moreover, fluctuations in real
quantities are attributed to exogenous technological and taste shocks
combined with various sources of endogenous dynamics including ad-
justment costs, time-to-build capital goods, and the non-time-separability
of preferences (e.g., Kydland and Prescott (1982), Long and Plosser
(1983), Kydland (1984), and Prescott (1986)). Common characteristics of
these models are that there is a complete set of contingent claims to fu-
ture goods and services, agents have common information sets, and the
only "frictions" in the economy are due to technological factors. In par-
ticular, real business cycle (RBC) models abstract entirely from mone-
tary considerations and the fact that exchange in modern economies
occurs via the use of fiat money.
There are two interpretations of this modeling strategy. The first inter-
pretation is that monetary institutions and monetary policy are assumed
to be inherently neutral in the sense that real allocations are invariant to
innovations in financial arrangements and monetary policy. Money is a
veil regardless of how much the veil flutters. The second interpretation is
that the market organizations and the nature of monetary policy in theEICHENBAIJM & SINGLETON
sample period being examined are such as that an RBC model provides
an accurate characterization of the real economy. Under this interpreta-
tion RBC models be useful frameworks for examining the deter-
mination of real allocations for certain institutional environments and
dasses of monetary policies. Money may be a veil as long as the veil does
not flutter too much. In our view, proponents of RBC theories are not
claiming that monetary policy cannot or has never had a significant im-
pact on the fluctuation of real output, investment, or consumption.
Rather we subscribe to the second interpretation of RBC analyses as in-
vestigations of real allocations under the assumption that, to a good ap-
proximation, monetary policy shocks have played an insignificant role in
determining the behavior of real variables.
The assumption in equilibrium RBC models that monetary shocks
have not been an important source of aggregate fluctuations is similar to
the basic premise of certain early Keynesian models. According to these
models, interest rates affected at most long-lived fixed investments,
so the interest elasticity of aggregate demand was preceived as being
low. Furthermore, the principal shocks impinging on the economy had
their direct effects on aggregate demand. In particular, investment was
thought to be influenced capriciously by "animal spirits." Thus, aggre-
gate fluctuations were associated primarily with real shocks. Indeed, the
economic environment was assumed to be such that changes in the
money supply (both systematic arid current unanticipated shocks) had
small impacts on real economic activity. The latter feature of these mod-
els led to the conclusion that fiscal policy was preferred to monetary pol-
icy for stabilizing output fluctuation.
More recent Keynesian-style models share some common features
with both early Keynesian and equilibrium RBC models, but they are
also fundamentally different in several important respects. Proponents
of modern Keynesian models often argue that monetary policy shocks
have not been a significant source of "instability" in the U.S. economy.
For example Modigliani (1977, p. 12) states that "there is no basis for the
monetarists' suggestion that our post war instability can be traced to
monetary instability." Thus on this feature of the economy, proponents
of modern Keynesian models and of equilibrium RBC theories are often
in agreement.
However, for at least two reasons, it would be misleading to argue that
equilibrium RBC models and Keynesian models are simply different ver-
sions of business cycle models in which only (or primarily) real shocks
matter for fluctuations in real quantities. First, the propagation mecha-
nisms by which exogenous shocks impinge on the endogenous variables— — w
------ —
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are typically very different in the two classes of mOdels. As noted, equi-
librium RBC models focus on such technological frictions as gestation
lags in building capital or intertemporal nonseparability of preferences
in generating endogenous sources of dynamics. Contingent claims mar-
kets are assumed to be complete and goods and asset prices adjust freely
in competitive markets. In contrast, Keynesian models typically empha-
size various frictions that prevent perfectly flexible goods prices and
wages (e.g., Modigliani 1958, Taylor 1980). The sources of these rigidities
may be frictions associated with incomplete markets, contractual ar-
rangements, or imperfect competition among firms. These differences in
propagation mechanisms may imply very different reactions of the equi-
librium RBC and Keynesian economies to the same type of shock.
Second, and closely related to the first consideration, the potential
roles for stabilization in these economic environments may be very
different. The inflexible prices and incomplete markets in Keynesian
models have been used to justify activist fiscal and monetary policies
designed to stabilize output fluctuation. Of particular relevance for
our analysis is the important role often attributed to monetary policy
in affecting the cyclical behavior of real variables in Keynesian mod-
els. While exogenous monetary policy shocks may not be important
sources of aggregate fluctuations, activist monetary policies are often
deemed to have had significant effects on the propagation of non-
monetary shocks. Hence, though the sources of uncertainty may be real,
it seems clear that money plays a central role in modern Keynesian
models. This interpretation of modern Keynesian models was made
explicitly by Modigliani (1977, p. 1): "Milton Friedman was once quoted
as saying 'We are all Keynesians, now, and I am quite prepared to re-
ciprocate that 'we are all monetarists'—if by monetarism is meant as-
signing to the stock of money a major role in determining output and
prices'."
In contrast, equilibrium RBC models typically assume that there is a
complete set of contingent claims markets and that prices are perfectly
flexible. One implication of these assumptions in the models that have
been examined to date is that real allocations are Pareto optimal. This in
turn implies that there is no role for a central policy authority. Thus,
equilibrium RBC theories assume both that exogenous monetary shocks
have not been an important source of fluctuations, and that the policy
rules followed by the monetary authorities have not had an important
role in propagating nonmonetary shocks. Only under this joint hypothe-
sis does it seem likely that an equilibrium RBC model would accurately
characterize the economy.L.
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This artide presents and interprets some new evidence on the validity
of the RBC approach to business cycle analysis. Particular attention is
given to: (1) the question of whether monetary policy shocks were an
important determinant of real economic activity during the postwar pe-
nod, and (2) several potentially important pitfalls in interpreting the
available evidence as supporting or refuting the validity of RBC models.
The analysis of the first question bears on the validity of any business
cycle model that assumes such shocks have been important. Certain as-
pects of our findings can be viewed as being consistent with both early
Keynesian and equilibrium RBC models. However, the extreme assump-
tions that underlie the former models have been largely rejected in the
recent literature (see, e.g., Modigliani 1977).' Accordingly, in discussing
potential interpretations of our empirical findings we shall focus pri-
marily on the properties of what we call equilibrium business cycle mod-
els—monetary and nonmonetary models that are specified at the level
of preferences and technology. This allows us to address directly the
strengths and weaknesses of equilibrium REC models as explanations of
fluctuations in the U.S. economy during the postwar period.
To date, empirical investigations of RBC models have typically pro-
ceeded by fitting these models to the data and evaluating the extent to
which the cycles implied by the models match those exhibited by the
data. Virtually without exception, studies of RBC models have not con-
sidered explicitly the conditions under which RBC models emerge
approximately or exactly as special cases of monetary models of the busi-
ness cyde. In contrast, we begin our analysis in section 3 by setting forth
an explicit monetary business cycle model. The presentation of this
model serves three purposes. First, we are able to make precise one po-
tential link between monetary policy actions and real allocations in an
equilibrium model. Money matters in this model because agents face a
cash-in-advance constraint. Therefore the' money-output linkages in our
model are very much in the spirit of those in the recent models of Lucas
and Stokey (1983, 1984), Townsend (1982), and Svensson (1985) among
others. Within the context of this model, we provide sufficient condi-
tions for an RBC model to provide an accurate characterization of real
fluctuation in the monetary economy. The conditions discussed are, of
course, specific to the model examined. Nevertheless, we feel they are
1.Afterwe completed this paper, Bennett McCallum pointed out that an important im-
plication of early Keynesian business cyde models with sticky prices and a horizontal
LMfunctionis that money should not Granger cause nominal income. This implication
is, of course, counterfactual. The equilibrium real business cycle models that we exam-
ine do not have this implication.Real Business Cycles95
suggestive of the type of strong restrictions on monetary policy rules
that will be required for RBCmodelsto accurately approximate other,
more complicated, monetary models.
Second, we use this model to interpret Granger causal relations be-
tween nominal and real aggregates. Anticipating our results in sections
4 and 5, we find little empirical support for the proposition that money
growth or inflation Granger cause output growth. Interpreted within the
context of the monetary model of section 3, these results suggest that
exogenous shocks to the monetary growth rate were not an important
independent source of variation in output growth during the postwar
period in the United States. Admittedly, this conclusion emerges from
considering a model with very simple specifications of the production
and monetary exchange technologies, as well as a specific market struc-
ture. However, introducing more complicated market, structures that
lead to sticky prices and wages as in Fischer (1977) or overlapping nomi-
nal contracts as in Taylor (1980) would only increase the complexity of
the interaction between monetary growth and real economic activity.
This added complexity would make it more difficult to reconcile the ab-
sence of Granger causality of output growth by monetary growth with
the belief that exogenous monetary policy shocks were an important
source of variation in output. More generally, our empirical evidence
suggests that monetary models which imply that money growth rates
Grariger cause output growth are inconsistent with postwar U.S. data.
Third, for certain monetary policy rules, our monetary model implies
that the failure to find Granger causality from money to output is not
sufficient for an RBC model to accurately characterize the economic en-
vironment. More precisely, we argue that even if real shocks are the pre-
ominant source of variation in real quantities over the cycle, one may be
seriously misled using an RBC model to evaluate the implications of al-
ternative government policies. Essentially, monetary feedback policies
can be set in a manner that affects the time-series properties of output
even though exogenous monetary shocks are not important determi-
nants of output. This may be true even though RBC models appear to fit
the data for the sample period by the usual criteria.
The remainder of the artide is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
a brief review of the literature on equilibrium RBC models, and our equi-
librium monetary business cycle model is presented in section 3. In sec-
tion 4, the laws of motion for the quantity variables implied by an RBC
model are compared to those of the monetary model. These two models
are used to interpret bivariate vector autoregressive representations
(VARs) of money and output. A more extensive set of empirical results isEICHENBAUM &
presented in section 5. "Variance decompositions" for output are dis-
played for several multivariate time-series models of output, monetary
growth, inflation, and asset returns. Concluding remarks are presented
in section 6.
2.Overviewof Equilibrium Business Cycle Models
A primary goal of business cycle analysis is to explain the recurrent fluc-
tuations of real aggregate economic quantities about their trends and the
co-movements among different aggregate economic time series. A key
assumption of real business cyde theories is that monetary policy ac-
tions are unimportant for explaining either the amplitude or frequency
of business cydes. In the words of King and Plosser (1984), RBC theories
view "business cycles as arising from variations in the real opportunities
of the private economy, which include shifts in government purchases or
tax rates as well as technical and environmental conditions." (p. 363). In
this section we briefly summarize some of the sources of variations in
private market economies that have received the most attention in the
literature on RBC models.
In modeling aggregate fluctuations, RBC theorists often distinguish
between the exogenous sources of uncertainty impinging on economic
decisions and the endogenous propagation mechanisms for the exoge-
nous shocks. Adopting this taxonomy, we shall consider, first, the
various exogenous sources of uncertainty that have typically been em-
phasized in the recent literature. In modern economies, many types of
shocks impinge on the decisions of agents in different sectors. For the
purpose of aggregate business cycle analyses, it is typically assumed im-
plicitly or explicitly that idiosyncratic sector or agent-specific shocks
"average out" and have no effect on aggregate quantities. On the other
hand, the common components of individual shocks that remain after
aggregation are interpreted as the aggregate sources of uncertainty in
business cycle models. The number of these aggregate disturbances is
typically assumed to be small; often the number does not exceed the
number of real quantity variables appearing in the model.
Furthermore, when using RBC models to describe economic data, at-
tention has been restricted almost exclusively to exogenous shifts in the
production technologies of goods. See,, for example, Kydland and
cott (1982), Long and Plosser (1983), King and Plosser (1984), Altug
(1985), and Hansen (1985). Notably absent from these models are aggre-
gate shocks to preferences and to the fiscal policy rules of governments.
The omission of shocks to preferences seems to be simply a matter of
taste. Apparently, an implicit assumption in many of the RBC theories isReal Business Cycles97
that large technology shocks are more likely than large aggregate sto-
chastic shifts in tastes. We relax this assumption in constructing our II-
lustrative monetary and real business cycle models in sections 3 and 4.
The absence of shocks to government purchases or tax rates can be
explained by the nature of the models that have been developed to
date. Kydland and Prescott (1982), and many others since, have exam-
ined economies in which there is a complete set of markets for con-
tingent claims to future goods, there is no private information, and there
are no public goods. Therefore, real allocations are Pareto optimal in
these economies and there is no welfare-improving role for a central
government. The absence of incomplete insurance and market fail-
ures from these models can in part be attributed to the difficulties in-
volved in analyzing aggregate fluctuations in general equilibrium when
such "frictions" are present. However, in some cases, their absence also
seems to be a manifestation of the belief that aggregate fluctuation in
output that approximates that observed historically can be generated
by equilibrium models without introducing these frictions. Long and
Plosser (1983), for example, state, regarding their model, "We believe
that major features of observed business cycles typically will be found
lit the kind of model economy outlined above." (p. 42) A similar view
has recently been expressed by Prescott (1986): "Given the people's abil-
ity and willingness to inter- and intra-temporally substitute consump-
tion and leisure and given the nature of the changing production set,
there would be a puzzle if the American economy did not display the
business cycle phenomena. By display the business cycle phenomena,
I mean that the amplitudes of fluctuations of the key economic aggre-
gates and their serial correlation properties are close to that predicted by
theory." (p. 1)
Although RBC models have relied on unobserved technology shocks
to induce fluctuations in output, investment, consumption, and hours
worked, these models typically adopt quite parsimonious time-series
representations of these shocks. Parsimony is important if these models
are to have refutable implications. It has long been known that low-order
stochastic difference equations can generate recurring irregular cyclical
fluctuations not unlike those exhibited by aggregate time series. Thus,
the covariogram of a given set of variables implied by a model can be
matched to the sample covariagram of the data by specifying sufficiently
rich laws of motion for the unobserved shocks in a model. But clearly,
profligately parameterized specifications of unobserved shock processes
do not yield interesting explanations of business cycles. RBC models
lead to overidentifying restrictions on the autocovariance functions by
allowing for only a small number of shocks with parsimonious time-98• EICHENBAUM & SINGLETON
series representations. More complicated patterns of autocorrelations
and patterns of cross-correlations among the variables are then induced
by endogenous sources of dynamics. It is these endogenous sources of
dynamics (what King and Plosser (1985) refer to as the propagation
mechanisms) that are the centerpieces of equilibrium RBC theories.
To date, RBC theorists have stressed the role of technology and agents'
preferences in magnifying the response of economic systems to exoge-
nous impulses. For example, Kydland and Prescott (1982) assume that it
takes time to build capital goods (i.e., more than one period or decision
interval). This time-to-build technology has an important effect on the
time-series properties of investment and output. They also assume that
consumers' utility from leisure in the current period depends on past
leisure decisions. Specifically, the marginal utility of an additional unit
of leisure today is larger (smaller) the smaller (larger) is the amount of
leisure consumed in previous periods. This specification of preferences
leads to substantially more intertemporal substitution of leisure than the
comparable time-separable specification of preferences. Since hours
worked are more sensitive to a given change in the real wage rate with
this specification of preferences, they are better able to capture the fluc-
tuation in aggregate hours than the corresponding model with time-
separable utility. Nevertheless, their model fails short of providing an
adequate explanation of the time-series behavior of hours worked. Ef-
forts are currently under way to enrich the specification of the labor mar-
ket in their model in an attempt to improve the fit of the model (Hansen
1985).
Although the models examined by Kydland and Prescott (1982) and
Kydland (1984) fail to fully explain fluctuation in hours worked, it is
nevertheless striking that they do so well in attempting to replicate the
time-series behavior of several of the economic aggregates considered.
As the authors emphasize, their results are certainly encouraging, for
they show that fairly simple dynamic equilibrium models are capable of
generating the types of cycles that are similar to those that have been ob-
served historically. Moreover, these examples provide a useful reminder
of the fact that fluctuation in real quantities per se need not reduce social
welfare; real allocations are Pareto optimal in their model.
Those economists who believe firmly that monetary fluctuations and
the actions of the monetary authority are central to an understanding of
business cycles may be inclined to dismiss these models outright be-
cause of their omission of monetary considerations. Yet there seems to be
both indirect and direct evidence that such a dismissal is difficult to sup-
port. Indirect evidence is provided by Kydland and Prescott (1982), Long
and Plosser (1983), and Kydland (1984), among others. These authorsReal Business Cycles99
have shown that, for plausible values of the parameters characterizing
preferences and technology, the variances of the shocks to technology
can be chosen such that equilibrium RBC models imply empirical second
moments for certain real aggregates that approximately match the corre-
sponding sample second moments.
More formal evidence is provided in the provocative studies by Sims
(1980a, 1980b). He found that monetary shocks had little explanatory
power for industrial production during the post—World War II period
when lagged values of industrial production and nominal interest rates
were included. Sims interpreted the contribution of nominal interest
rates in predicting industrial production as capturing expectations about
the future productivity of capital, which is very much lit the spirit of real
business cycle analysis. Litterman and Weiss (1985) corroborate Sims's
fmdings and also give an RBC interpretation to their findings.
The models considered by Kydland and Prescott (1982) and Long and
Plosser (2983) are representative agent models with complete markets so
that credit does not enter prominently in the determination of real quan-
tities. King and Plosser (1984) have discussed an extended version of an
equilibrium RBC model in which there is a role for organized credit mar-
kets. Their model can be interpreted as a RBC model in which certain
(perhaps informational) frictions in private markets lead to the creation
of institutions that specialize in issuing credit. King and Plosser proceed
to argue that, while credit may have an important influence on the nature
of aggregate fluctuations, the actions of the Federal Reserve's Open Mar-
ket Committee may not be an important independent source of fluctua-
tions in real quantities and relative prices. As evidence for this proposi-
tion, they note that real output seems to be significantly correlated with
inside money but is only weakly correlated with outside money.
More recently, critics of the view that RBC theories are accurate char-
acterizations of the postwar experience have noted that these findings
are also consistent with comparably simple business cycle models in
which monetary policy plays an important role. For instance, McCallum
(1983a) has shown that if the Federal Reserve followed an interest rate
rule (or mixed interest rate—monetary aggregate rule) for most of the
postwar period, then the interest rate innovation in Sims's regressions
may be a proxy for the innovation in the policy rule of the Fed. For the
same reasons, the analysis by King and Plosser (1984) may not accurately
capture the effects of monetary policy shocks on real output (McCallum
1985).
Critics of RBC models have provided several additional challenges to
the conclusion that the RBC models studied to date explain the postwar
experience in the United States Most of the studies purporting to pro-100 EICHENBAUM& SINGLETON
vide evidence in support of RBC models have examined only a limited
set of own- and cross-correlations of aggregate quantity variables. In
particular, cross-correlations of relative prices and asset returns with ag-
gregate real quantities have typically not been studied. There is no a pri-
ori reason why the restrictions examined should be given more weight
than other restrictions on cross-correlations in evaluating the perfor-
mance of these models. When cross-correlations of asset returns and
output are examined there is substantially more evidence against RBC
models (see, for example, Mehra and Prescott (1985)). Moreover, when
particular RBC models are subjected to formal methods of estimation
and inference which incorporate a fairly comprehensive set of moment
restrictions, the results are not supportive of the models (e.g., Altug
(1985), Eichenbaum, Hansen, and Singleton (1985), and Mankiw, Rotem-
berg, and Summers (1985)).
The acceptance or rejection of previous RBC models must be based in
part on an assessment of the plausibility of the variances and auto-
correlations of the technology shocks.2 Kydland and Prescott (1982)
take their structure of preferences and technology as given and then
determine the values of the variances of the shocks to technology that
are consistent with particular second moments of observed variables.
Prescott (1986) provides an estimate of the standard deviation of the
shock to technology in a simple growth model, but this measure is
in effect the standard error of the residual from regressing the growth
rate of output on the growth rates of capital and labor. This measure
is justified by his assumption of a Cobb-Douglas production func-
tion defined over labor and capital and thus is clearly model dependent
in the same manner that the Kydlatid-Prescott estimates of standard
deviations were model In a manner that attempts to account
for measurement errors, Prescott estimates the ratio of the standard
deviations of the percentage changes in the technology shock and
output to be approximately .40. It seems difficult to assess the plausi-
bffity of this estimate and related estimates provided by Kydland and
Prescott (1982), especially in light of the highly aggregated nature of
their models.
Furthermore, we have little independent evidence about the absolute
magnitudes of these second moments, since the theories do not lead us
to specific sources for these disturbances. Hamilton (1983) provides
some descriptive evidence that oil price shocks were an important source
of aggregate fluctuations in the United States during the postwar period.
Also, Miron (1985) argues that weather shocks are an important source
2. See MeCalilum (1985) for a related criticism of the Kydland-Prescott analysis.Real Business Cycles. 101
of variation in aggregate consumption. This strategy of attempting to
quantify the various shocks impinging on the economy may yield impor-
tant insights into the nature of real shocks underlying business cycles.
A complementary strategy is to assess empirically the relative impor-
tance of alternative types of shocks in the context of models that accom-
inodate various types of shocks. RBC theorists have not attempted to
assess the relative importance of monetary versus technology shocks, for
example. A comparison of the stochastic properties of these shocks may
lead to more convincing conclusions about RBC models than statements
about the absolute magnitudes of technology or preference shocks. In
models that accommodate monetary shocks, it would be possible to de-
compose the variation in output into variation attributable to monetary
and real shocks (assuming the model is identified). Then the theoretical
problem of characterizing the classes of economies and monetary poli-
cies for Which real allocations are well described by RBC models could
be addressed. To our knowledge, King and Plosser (1984) have come
closest to attempting such an exercise. However, they stop short of con-
structing a monetary model and evaluating the relative importance of al-
ternative shocks. Constructing a model at a plausible level of generality
and performing these calculations is admittedly a formidable task. Re-
cent work is just beginning to provide the necessary tools needed to
solve for the stochastic equilibria of monetary models (e.g., Lucas and
Stokey 1984). Nevertheless, simple illustrative monetary models can be
constructed, and it is this task to which we turn next.
3. An Equilibrium Business Cycle Model
Here we present an equilibrium business cycle model and discuss some
of its properties. The model is that of a monetary economy in which an-
ticipated monetary growth has real economic effects. Money is intro-
duced into the model using the construct of a cash-in-advance constraint
and this constraint is the only source of monetary nonneutrality in this
model. In particular, we abstract from frictions that might lead to sticky
prices or wages, and agents are assumed to have rational expectations.
The exclusion of these and other sources of frictions from the economic
environment should not be interpreted as necessarily reflecting a view
that other frictions are absent from modern economies. Rather, we are
intentionally constructing an economic model that is simple to analyze
and which allows us to discuss several pitfalls in interpreting the time-
series evidence that purportedly supports or refutes RBC models. Many
of our observations are valid for a much larger class of real and monetary
models than those examined explicitly.102• EICHENBAiJM & SINGLETON
The monetary business cycle model that we consider is an extended
version of the RBC model discussed by Garber and King (1983) (which is
closely related to the model in Long and Plosser (1983)). Suppose that a
representative, competitive firm produces a nondurable consumption
goodusing the input;. The production function foris given by
(3.1)
where Aa shock to the consumption good technology at date t. The
intermediate gooddepreciates at the rate of 100 percent when used in
production. The firm buys Xtfromconsumers in a competitive market at
the unit real price ofAcquisitionsof the input are made so as to maxi-
mize the expected discounted value of future profits. For our model, this
optimum problem simplifies to the following static optimum problem: at
each date t the firm choosesto maximize
—wa;.(3.2)
Profits of the firixj are returned each period to the shareholders in the
form of dividends,
The intermediate good, ;, is storable. The representative consumer
has an initial endowment of the intermediate good of k0. The law of mo-
tion for the consumer's holdings of the intermediate good at the begin-
ning of period t is given by
= — (3.3)
In equation (3.3),represents a stochastic shock to the storage
technology.
In addition to holdings of the intermediate good, the wealth of the rep-
resentative consumer indudes holdings of claims to the future cash
flows of the finn and money holdings. We shall let the number
of shares in the firm held by the consumer and denotethe ex-
dividend real (money) price per share in the firm.
There are a variety of ways in which to generate valued fiat money in
theoretical models (see, e.g., the volume edited by Kareken and Wallace
(1980)). Following Lucas (1980, 1984), Townsend (1982), Lucas and Stokey
(1984), and Svensson (1985), we adopt the construct of a cash-in-advance
constraint. While this construct is known to have some undesirable char-
acteristics, analytically convenient and can be interpreted as arising
from a very special shopping time technology (e.g., McCailum 1983b).
The timing conventions for monetary transactions in this economy areReal Business Cycles103
assumed to be as follows. The consumer enters the period t with a pre-
determined cash balance M,, and a predetermined share, ;, of claims to
the dividends of the representative firm.Helearns the realization of all
time t random variables and then chooses the quantity of intermediate
goods (Xf) to sell to the firm and the amount of consumption goods (ce)to
purchase at the dollar pricePayment for the sale of; to the firm is
received in cash after the consumption decision. Therefore, the money
received (if any) cannot be used to relax the cash-in-advance constraint
in period t.It follows that goods purchases must obey the cash-in-
advance constraint
Mf.(3.4)
After the goods market is dosed, the consumer receives in cash his share
of dividends, where D1 is the money value of dividends at date t. In
addition, the consumer receives a lump sum monetary transfer from the
policy authority in the amountFinally, at the end of period t, money
and equity shares in the firm are traded. Thus, the evolution of the
nominal money holdings by the consumer are described by the equation
Mf++ + —P'c,]+ + Dt]z, + + (3.5)
where W, is the per unit cash payment from the firm to the consumer for
supplying the intermediate good. Dividing both sides of equations (3.4)
and (3.5) by Pf yields the real relations
+1/Ps+ + — + + + +Pr,,(3.6)
C,m,,(3.7)
where lowercase letters denote real quantities and;= We shall
henceforth assume that the constraint (3.7) is always binding. The con-
sistency of this assumption with the specification of other aspects of the
model will be discussed after we derive the equilibrium law of motion
for x,.
The consumer is assumed to choose contingency plans forx,, M, +
andz, soas to maximize the logarithmic intertemporal objective
function
(3.8)
subject to the constraints (3.3) and104• EICHENBAUM & SINGLETON
+7/Pr+ +1 = + + +;.(3.9)
In (3.8), E, denotes the expectation conditioned on agents' information
set at date t and the disturbanceisa taste shock, which is assumed to
follow the process
=vi- laI E 1,(3.10)
where is normally distributed with mean zero, variance andis
not serially correlated.
The first-order conditions for this optimum problem are
{
/3 + 0,(3.12)
+ /3 + + i+ = 0,(3.13)
whereis the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint (3.9).
Substituting equation (3.11) into equation (3.12) gives
= (3.14)
Using (3.4), an equivalent way of writing (3.14) is
1= (3.14') t+lCt+1J j
whichhas the following interpretation. By selling a unit of the intermedi-
ate good to the firm at date t the consumer receivesdollars, which can
be used to acquire the consumption good at date t + 1. Therefore, the
benefits from providingare evaluated using the marginal utility of
consumption at date t + 1 + +Onthe other hand, postpone-
ment of the sale of x for one period yields the physical rate of return of
0, +1fromstorage. At date t + 1 the consumer can then sell x for +
dollars,and these dollars can be used to purchase consumption
goods at date t + 2. Equation (3.14') states that in equilibrium the con-
sumer is indifferent between these two strategies. Notice that the timing
convention of our model implies that, in supplying the intermediate good
to the firm at date t for a per unit nominal price W,, consumers are ef-Real Business Cy&s 105
fectively contracting for an uncertain per unit real price of +at
date t + 1.
Equation (3.14) can be used to determine the equilibrium law of mo-
tion foronce a money supply rule has been specified. We assume that
follows the process
= (3.15)
whereis a vector of state variables that are known at date t. (Recall that
+isknown at the end of date t andis determined at date t —1.)
Substituting equation (3.15) into equation (3.14) and using the cash-in-
advance constraint leads to
(316)
I J I +c, J
Inequilibrium,=1(all equity claims are held) and c, =y,(con-
sumption equals output). Also, the first-order conditions to the firm's
optimum problem imply that the real price of the intermediate good
equals the marginal product of the good in production:
=a-1 (3.17)
Imposing these equilibrium conditions and using equation (3.16) gives
EI 1—E 318 —
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satisfies equation Therefore, equation (3.19) is the equilibrium
law of motion forTaking logarithms of both sides of equation (3.19)
gives
enx, = + €n[/3 pa- 1-' + — enf(sj).(3.20)
3. In solving forwe have followed the common practice of not imposing non-negativity
constraints on the capital stockWhether or not this constraint is binding in practice
will dependartthe distribution of the shocks and the particular realizations in the cur-106 EICHENBAUM & SINGLETON
More general linear time-series representations for could easily be
accommodated; they would only complicate the manner in which prefer-
ence shocks enter equation (3.20).
Before proceeding with our discussion of equation (3.20), it will be
instructive to discuss briefly whether the assumption that the cash-in-
advance constraint is always binding is consistent with our assump-
tions about the distributions of the exogenous shocks. In the context of
our model, the cash-in-advance constraint is binding if and only if the
nominal interest rate on a one-period pure discount bond that pays off
one dollar is positive. Thus, to theck for consistency we must verify that,
having imposed the constraint, the nominal rate implied by the model is
in fact positive. The rate of return on a one-period nominal bond in this
environment is given by4
+=- —1.
In the absence of preference shocks, a necessary and sufficient condition
for +1tobe positive is that the growth rate of money, f(s1), exceed 13.
We used the growth rate of MI as a measure of in our empirical
analysis. Interestingly, for the sample period 1949:1 through 1983:6, this
measure of f(s,) exceeds .995 (a plausible value of /3 for monthly decision
intervals) in all but five months. More generally, the assumption that
> 0 imposes restrictions on the joint distribution of the taste
shock,and f(s,).5
From equation (3.15) we see that the growth rate in the money supply,
— is equal to It follows that changes in the
growth rate of the money supply affect the consumer's decision rule for
rent period. One way of obtaining a solution for which the constraint never binds is to
assume that in equilibriumis proportional to k,withthe proportionality factor being
in the interval (0,1). This is the approach taken by Garber and King (1983) for their real
economy. It turns out that the two approaches yield the same law of motion for Xtforthe
real economy in the absence of taste shocks, but they differ when taste shocks are
present. In practice, neither solution may be strictly correct for the chosen distributions
of the shocks under a non-negativity constraint. Fortunately, our key points about the
properties of real versus monetary business cycle models emphasized subsequently are
not sensitive to which solution is studied.
4. This relation is derived by introducing one-period bond holdings into the consumer's
budget constraint and deducing the first order conditions for this modified optimum
problem without assuming that the cash-in-advance constraint is always binding.
5.Throughoutthis paper the assumption that is lognormally distributed is made
only for convenience; none of our qualitative conclusions depend on this assumption.
The expression for implied by our model when the distribution ofis left un-
specified is identical to the expression in the text, except that is replaced by
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supplying the intermediate good. The dependence ofon monetary
growth, in turn, implies that equilibrium output and dividends are also
affected by monetary policy. As is typical of models with cash-in-advance
constraints, increases in the grc)wth rate of money decrease output.
A similar property often emerges in corresponding models in which
money is introduced directly as an argument of the agent's utility func-
tion or through a shopping time transactions technology. Lucas (1985)
has conjectured that a positive relation between money growth and out-
put growth may obtain with the addition of informational imperfections
to models with cash-in-advance constraints. The qualitative nature of the
major conclusions drawn subsequently from equation (3.20) and our em-
pirical findings are not sensitive to whether the sign of the effect of
money on output is positive or negative. What is crucial is that money
affect real activity through more than just the current innovation in
money.
Notice that real allocations in our monetary economy are unaffected
by permanent and proportional increases in either the level or the growth
rate of the money supply. Thus, this monetary model displays the prop-
erty of superneutrality. The result that a once-and-for-all change in the
level of the money stock has no effect on output was derived in a more
general setting by Lucas (1984). The stronger result that money is super-
neutral will typically not obtain in models in which consumers make non-
trivial labor supply decisions as well as consumption decisions.
Examination of the logarithms of equations (3.1), (3.17), and (3.19) re-
veals several interesting characteristics of the model set forth above:
€nx1 = + ±en;-i+(a —1)env,+
+ enf(s,-— enf(s,),(3.21)
=aenx,+ (3.22)
ena + (a —1)€nx,+ (3.23)
Notice first of all that output is a function of both(through
and XThisis an illustration of the more general principle that sectoral
shocks associated with the production of intermediate goods will have a
cumulative effect on final output. Furthermore, if these shocks are posi-
tively correlated, then the variance of the sum will exceed the sum of the
own variances. That the "aggregate" technological shock impinging on
final output represents such a combination of shocks may affect what is
perceived to be a plausible value for the variance of the shock to final
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Equations (3.21)—(3.23) also illustrate the well-known, but often ig-
nored, fact that trends in the endogenous variables may be intimately
related. Simply put, this is because all of the endogenous variables are
functions of subsets of the same set of taste and technology shocks and
trends enter the model primarily through these shocks. It turns out that
many of our statistical results using VARs are not insensitive to the as-
sumptions about the nature of trends in the variables examined. The
sensitivity of estimates from multivariate autoregressive representations
to the method of detrending has been noted previously by Kang (1985)
and Bernanke (1985). In section 5 we use equations (3.21)—(3.23) to in-
terpret the sensitivities of our results to the specifications of trends.
Having deduced the equilibrium laws of motion for the real quantities
in our monetary model, we turn next to an investigation of conditions
under which an RBC model provides an accurate approximation to this
economy.
4. Interpreting Bivariate VARsusing
Monetary and RBC Models
As background information for comparing the properties of the rnone-
tary and RBC models, it is instnzctive to examine some empirical evi-
dence. Accordingly, we begin with a discussion of the findings from
estimating bivanate autoregressive time-series representations of output
and money growth. A much more comprehensive set of empirical re-
suits is discussed in section 5.
The Granger causality relations between output and money were in-
vestigated using monthly data for the U.S. economy over the sample pe-
riod February 1949 through June 1983. Output was measured by the
Industrial Production Index constructed by the Federal Reserve Board.
Money was measured by Ml and was obtained from the CITIBASE data
tape. Table 4.1 displays the results for the growth rate of output (the dif-
ference in the logarithm of industrial production) and the second dif-
ference in the logarithm of Ml. The second difference of the money
stock was used, because this is the empirical counterpart to the construct
appearing in the expression for in section 3. Both and
were assumed to be covariance stationary stochastic pro-
cesses. (The issue of trends is discussed in more detail in section 5.) All
VARs included twelve lags of each variable and a constant. In none of the
five sample periods considered does Granger cause at
the one percent level. And only in the sample period 1959:2—1983:6 does
Granger cause Mny, at the five percent level. Though not re-Real Business Cycles109
ported in table 4.1, the corresponding results obtained with +
placeof +1werevirtuallyidentical.
These results could plausibly be interpreted as evidence in favor of the
view that RBC models provide accurate characterizations of the behavior
of real quantity variables for this sample period. The remainder of this
section explores ways in which this interpretation of the evidence can be
reconciled with economic theory and ways in which advocates of various
models can be misled by this evidence. In subsection 4.a we study a ver-
sion of the model from section 3 in which no cash-in-advance constraint
is imposed. In addition, we deduce conditions under which real alloca-
tions from this RBC model correspond to those in the cash-in-advance
economy. Subsection 4.b explores the possibility of RBC models pro-
viding an accurate, though not exact, approximation to the monetary
economy.
4.a. AN RBC MODEL
Consider the following version of the economy of• section 3 in which
agents do not face a cash-in-advance constraint. Suppose that agents
face the period budget constraint
c1+z1 +1= (d,+ + w1 (4.1)
Table 4.1DECOMPOSITION OF VARIANCE OF
49,2—83,652,1 —79,1252,1 —83,659,2—79,1259,2—83,6
93 94 92 92
(4) (4) (4) (5)
7 6 8 8





Probability Values: Granger causality of
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
.158 .189 .185 .230
0.00
.029
Probability Values: Granger causality of
.035 .024 .025 .079
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
.028
0.00
a. Entries give the percentage of the forecast error in the error variance accounted for by the orthogon.
alized innovations in the listed variables. The order of orthogonalization is as listed. Standard errors are
displayed in parentheses.
b. denotes the growth rate of industrial output at time tand denotes the change in the
growth rate of the stock of money at time t.
c.Probability values for the null hypothesis that the lagged coefficients of the given variable in the re-
gression equation for are zero.
d.Probabilityvalues for the null hypothesis that the lagged coefficients of the given variable in the re-
gression equation for are zero.110 EICHENBATJM& SINGLETON
In this economy the consumption good is the numeraire and agents are
• paid in consumption goods for supplying the intermediate good to the
firm. Payments during period t are available for immediate consumption
• during period t. Also suppose that the representative consumer chooses
contingency plans forx,,and so as to maximize the logarithmic
intertemporal objective function (3.8) subject to the constraints (3.3) and
(4.1). In equilibrium, ; =1(share market clears), y, =(consump-
tion equals output),
+=Yt(4.2)
(dividends plus factor costs exhaust output), and the supply and de-
rnand of the intermediate good are equilibrated, so that equation (3.17)
holds. Imposing these equilibrium conditions and using arguments simi-
lar to those leading to equation (3.19) yields the following laws of motion
for the quantity variables:
= ; - (4.3)
= (4.4)
=(1—a) (4.5)
where the last expression follows from equation (4.2).
The equilibrium laws of motion for ; in the monetary and nonmone-
tary economies, given by equations (3.19) and (4.3) respectively, differ by
the multiplicative term - andthe dating of the preference
shock v. The latter difference arises because cash payments received at
date t from the sale of the intermediate good to the firm cannot be used
to acquire the consumption good until date t +1in the monetary model.
When will the real allocations be identical in. the monetary and non-
monetary models described above? The difference between the dating of
the preference shock in the law of motion forwill trivially be inconse-
quential if preference shocks are absent from the model. Most of the RBC
models that have been studied to date do exclude preference shocks. Al-
ternatively, if the preference shock follows a logarithmic random walk
(a =1),then again this shock will not appear in the law of motion for
x1. Additionally, the monetary term in equation (3.19) must be zero.
This will be the case if the monetary authorities follow a constant growth
rate rule. Under these circumstances, equations (3.19) and (4.3) give the
same equilibrium laws of motion forThis, in turn, implies that the
real equilibrium for the real and monetary models are identical, sinceReal Business Cycles• 111
and c1 are proportional toin both economies. Given that a =1,a con-
stant monetary growth rate is both necessary and sufficient for the real
allocations to be identical in these economies. In addition, it can be shown
that formulas for asset prices and relative prices of goods are identical in
the monetary and RBC models under these assumptions.
4.b. COMPARING MONETARY AND REAL BUSINESS CYCLE MODELS
Now, in fact, the monetary growth rate has not been constant over the
postwar period. In our view, this observation alone is not sufficient to
dismiss an RBC explanation of aggregate fluctuations. The extreme case
of monetary policy having no impact on real allocations, what we wifi
refer to as the strong RBC hypothesis, is presumably not what most pro-
ponents of RBC theories have in mind when arguing that RBC models fit
the data. Instead, such claims are more plausibly interpreted as state-
ments about the insensitivity of real allocations to the current structure
of financial institutions, and the insignificance of exogenous shocks to
the money supply relative to exogenous real shocks. We refer to this
latter interpretation as the weak RBC hypothesis. Initially we discuss
conditions under which measures of monetary growth are not likely to
Granger cause the growth rate of output under the weak RBC hypothe-
sis, Then, circumstances under which measures of monetary growth
Granger cause the growth rate of output are discussed.
In our illustrative monetary model, the equilibrium quantities will be
approximately unaffected by exogenous money supply shocks if the
change in the growth rate of money is not too variable relative to prefer-
ence and technology shocks. Under this condition, the last term in ex-
pression (3.21),
enx, = +. +enx,-1
+(a — + eno, —&enM,+1'(4.6)
can be ignored. The corresponding expression from the RBC model set
forth in section 4.a is
ertx,= en$+ + enx,-+(a — -+ (4.7)
Comparingequations (4.6) and (4.7)wesee that when technology and
taste shocks predominate the two laws of motion are nearly identical, the
only difference being the dating of the preference shock. Thus, whether
or not a =1,the RBC model will provide a reasonably good approxima-
tion to the monetary economy under this assumption about monetary112 EICHENBAUM & SINGLETON
growth. Furthermore, for the sample sizes typically considered in macro-
economic time-series analyses, money may not Granger cause output in
this system due to statistical power considerations.
It seems difficult to reconcile the absence of Granger causality from
money to output with the opposing view that monetary policy shocks
contributed significantly to the variability of output during our sample
period. Within the model of section 3, one such reconciliation is achieved
by assuming that +isserially uncorrelated (monetary growth
follows a random walk). Then the last term in equation (4.6) is serially
uncorrelated. Consequently, money will not Granger cause output in the
bivariate system +1].Thiswill be the case even though
money shocks affect output and may have a large variance relative to real
shocks. The assumption that the change in the monetary growth rate is
serially uncorrelated is counterfactual, however (see table 4.1).
More generally, suppose that the monetary growth rate is chosen by
the policy authorities to follow the process
+'= 71-i+Yz eny, -2+ 73 AenM,+
= (1—y3L)—'[y1€ny,-'+ y2eny,-21+(1—y3L)—' (4.8)
where< 1,isa random shock to the policy rule in period t that is
independent of the preference and technology shocks, and L is the lag
operator. Taking the first difference of the output equation (3.22) and
substituting equation (4.8) for A2€nM, +andignoring constant terms
gives the following equations:
Mny, =a[(a—1)€nv1+ —(1—73L)'{YiA€ny,-
+ 72 Mny,-+A€nA,—a(1—y3L)1 (4.9)
+1= (1—73L)-'[71 A€ny,-2 + (4.10)
In this example, ÷willnot Granger cause Mny, only under the
special assumptions that=üin equation (4.8) and the composite
shock [(a —1)env,+€nO,+ + isserially uncorrelated.
The assumption that the projection of A2€nM,onto its own history
and the past history of Mny, is not a function of -j0, is
counterfactual. Also, we are not aware of any compelling scientific evi-
dence that strongly suggests that either the changes or levels of the taste
and technology shocks are white-noise processes.
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tive to the variances of the real shocks, then money may not Granger
cause output even though +ishighly variable. In particular,
suppose that the variance of (1 —73L)- issmall relative to the vari-
ances of the terms involving the other shocks, so that the monetary pol-
icy shock is not an important independent source of variation of output
in this model. Then inspection of equation (3.22),(3.23), and(4.9) re-
veals that monetary growth may fail to Granger cause output in the
multivariate system +Thisscenario pre-
sumably motivates RBC analyses.
While it is necessarily true that real shocks should be the focal point of
business cyde analyses if monetary shocks are relatively unimportant,
as the bivariate VARs suggest, it is premature to conclude that RBC models
correctly represent the structure of the economy. The economic environ-
ment leading to the use of fiat money as a medium of exchange may be
very different from the economic environment underlying RBC models.
That is, modern institutional arrangements are associated with market
structures very different from the structures adopted in RBC models
and hence monetary models may have very different sources of en-
dogenous dynamics.
To illustrate this point, consider again the output equation (4.9) associ-
ated with the money supply rule (4.8). Suppose that the linear combi-
nation of the taste and technology shocks in equation (4.9) is serially
uncorrelated. The persistence in output is then due entirely to the fact
that the monetary policy rule feeds back on lagged output growth; there
is nothing technological about this persistence. Yet an RBC theorist might
explore non-time-separable specifications of technology and preferences
in order to induce autocorrelations similar to those implied by equation
(4.9). it seems likely that RBC models could be developed with suffi-
ciently rich specifications of preferences and technology to match the au-
tocorrelations of output quite dosely. For, as we have noted, low-order
stochastic difference equations are often acceptable representations of
economic aggregates. But inferences about the structure of the economy
using an RBC model could be very misleading. It follows that policy
analysis using the RBC formulation of the economy could lead to mis-
guided policy prescriptions.
As a second example of this phenomenon, suppose that is
set so as to substantially attenuate (or completely offset) the impact of
certain shocks on Then the time-series properties of will be
determined by.the remaining shocks in equation (4.6) and money growth
may not Granger cause output growth. Nevertheless, the properties of
are dearly affected by the particular feedback rule adopted by theEICHENBAUM & SINGLETON
monetary authorities. We suspect that a version of this scenario could be
developed in which lagged values of also were useful in pre-
dicting
Up to this point we have focused on situations in which money growth
does not Granger cause output growth. in anticipation of empirical re-
suits using linearly detrended data reported in section 5, we briefly ex-
plore structural interpretations of a Granger causal relation from money
to output. The most straightforward interpretation of such a statistical
relation is that in fact monetary policy actions are important determi-
nants of aggregate real activity. On the other hand, a statistical relation
between money and output may reflect the fact that money is proxying
for unobserved shocks to tastes and technologies. That is, if there are
more aggregate shocks to preferences and technology than real variables
induded in the VAR, then in general +willGranger cause the
real variables. This is the interpretation of money-output correlations
adopted by Litterman and Weiss (1985).
To illustrate a signaling role for money, consider a trivariate VAR of
Mny1, arid +Inour model, when aI there are three
real shocks, so if monetary growth follows a feedback rule like equation
(4.8), then +willconvey information about (Mny1, Mnx1] that
is not embodied in the past histories of the quantity variables. Thus,
money will Granger cause output in this setting even if monetary policy
shocks are absent from the model. On the other hand, when a =1,
there are only two real shocks so that the vector of quantities will not be
Granger caused by monetary growth if the variance of the monetary
shock is small.
We now examine the question of what proportion of the variance of
output is accounted for by innovations in nominal aggregates. Attempts
to answer this question raise additional questions regarding the inter-
pretation of VARs. We begin by describing a procedure proposed by Sims
(1980b) for calculating variance decompositions and then review an im-
portant objection to the procedure which has been raised by Blanchard
and Watson (1984) and Bernanke (1985), among others. These issues
are intimately connected with the set of circumstances under which
Granger-causality tests can be used to shed light on structural, rather
than statistical, issues.
Let=[S'11. where S11 is a jx1 vector of real variables and
is a (k —j) x1 vector of nominal variables. We suppose that S1 has the
vector autoregressive representation,
G(L)S1 = (4.11)Real Business CycI es115
whereG(L) is a k x k matrix polynomial in the lag operator L, I +
G1L+ G2L2 +...whichsatisfies the irivertibility conditions, and
is a k x I vector of serially uncorrelated disturbances which may be
contemporaneously correlated. In general the elements of the vector
will be nonlinear functions of the innovations to agents' preferences,
productivity shocks and nominal disturbances. Suppose that the analyst
estimates the parameters of G(L) and the contemporaneous covariance
of
= (4.12)
The analyst wishes to partition the variance of the T-step ahead forecast
error of a particular element ofinto the portions attributable to innova-
tions in the different components of
Suppose that the forecast error variance of interest is that of the first
component ofS11. Let L1 be the 1 x k row vector with 1 in the first
place and zero elsewhere. Also let S, denote the moving aver-
age representation ofwhere M(L) is a k x k matrix of polynomials in
the lag operator which satisfies the invertibility conditions and M(L)G(L)
=I,with I being the k x k identity matrix. Then the T-step ahead fore-
cast error ofcan be written as
— += +r—M1a1+ — ...—M,.— + (4.13)
The variance of the T-step forecast error ofis equal to
E{1S1,+ — +J2} = ±± (4.14)
1'= Oj1 1= 1
whereM?(i,j) is the ijthelementof the matrix M1,
Ifisdiagonal, then the percentage of the variance in the T-step fore-





AsT approaches infinity the variance of the T-step ahead forecast error
of S11 converges to the unconditional variance of S11. Accordingly, the116 EICHENBAUM & SINGLETON
percentage of the unconditional variance ofwhich is attributable to
innovations inis well approximated by calculating (4.15) for large
values of T.
In general, the matrixis not diagonal, so that some set of normal-
izations or identifying restrictions must be imposed on the system be-
fore a decomposition ofcan be calculated. More precisely, we define a
new set of error terms
= (4.16)
with F chosen such that
= = = (4.17)
and isa k x k diagonal positive definite matrix. Then equation
(4.11) and
G(L)S1 = (4.18)
are observationally equivalent representations ofIn general there are
an infinite number of matrices F that satisfy equation (4.17), so normaliza-
tions must be imposed before calculating variance decompositions.
The method suggested by Sims (1980b) for decomposing the vector
into orthogonal components (i.e., for choosing a particular matrix F) is to
proceed with a particular ordering of the elements ofand restrict at-
tention to the class of matrices F which are lower block triangular. This
amounts to setting the off-diagonal elements of the Jth row of F' equal to
minus the coefficient onfrom the projection of the Jth element of s, on
elements 1 throughj —1of s,, (1 =1,...,j — 1).In general the matrix
F depends on the ordering of the variables. Once the matrix F has been
chosen we can substitute=into (4.15) to achieve the desired de-
composition. Notice that ifisdiagonal then there is a unique matrix
F =Iwhich satisfies equations (4.16) and (4.17). As Sims (1980b), Blan-
chard and Watson (1984), Bernanke (1985), and Cooley and LeRoy (1985)
have noted, this procedure for choosing the matrix F presumes that the
structural model foris recursive whenis not diagonal.
In the context of the following example, we discuss the pitfalls of
Sims's procedure when applied to àur problem. Consider again the rep-
resentation (4.9) for Relation (4.9) implies that the innovation to
the growth rate of output will be a linear combination of the innovations
to agents' preference shocks, sector-specific technology shocks, and the
change in the growth rate of money. In order to make our example asReal Business Cycles. 117
simple as possible we concentrate on a bivariate time series representa-
tion for and +andsimplify the stochastic structure
of the model. Suppose that preference shocks follow a random walk
(a =1),0, =1,and the law of motion for the technology shock is
given by
= (4.19)
where D(L) 1 —14(L) isan invertible polynomial in the lag operator,
d(L) =(d1+d2L+d3L2+ ...), andis a serially uncorrelated ran-
dom variable. It is convenient to modify relation (4.6) by replacing the
term +byth2€nM,+where When z =1,we obtain
the monetary model of section 3. When z =0,we obtain the RBC
model.discussed in section 4.a that imposes the strong RBC hypothesis.
Under these assumptions, (again ignoring constant terms), the law of
motion of MnY, becomes
Mny, =MnA,—zap.,,(4.20)
where p., +Substitutingequation (4.19) into equation (4.20)
and rearranging, gives
= -— Zap., + -+ (4.21)
Next, suppose that the monetary authority sets the change in the mone-
tary growth rate according to the feedback rule
p., = + f(L)p.,-+ + (4.22)
where e(L) and f(L) are scalar invertible polynomials in the lag operator
L, xisa scalar constant, andis a serially uncorrelated random vari-
able. We assume thatandare contemporaneously uncorrelated.
Relations (4.21) and (4.22) imply that Mny, and p., have the bivariate
VAR representation
Ii—zalId(L)zcxd(L)1k€ny,ii+ (423
L JL° 1]Le(L) f(L)J - J
where
Ie,,1=Ii—ZaXzal1€At1.(4.24)
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Suppose the analyst estimates the VARequation(423) and has in hand
estimates of the three parameters of Forthis economic model isa
function of four parameters: za, x, and wherethe last two pa-
rameters are the variances ofandrespectively. It follows that the
V parametersof the innovation covariance matrix cannot be identified sep-
arately from the parameters of the regression equation. This, in turn,
implies that the methods proposed by Blanchard and Watson (1984), Ber-
nanke (1985), arid Sims (1985) for analyzing innovation covariance ma-
trices are in general not applicable to dynamic economic models. Put
differently, proponents of this approach are implicitly ruling out a large
and important class of dynamic economic models as candidates for ex-
plaining business cydes.
Pursuing this observation, suppose that the empirical evidence sug-
gests that is not Granger caused byWithin the context of equa-
tion (4.23), this implies that zcx= 0unless we are in the counterfactual
case where d(L) is identically equal to f(L). Setting z =0leads to the
structural model
=FdL 01kenyg-'1+ I 1(425)
L J Le(L)f(L)J L J•
Themodel (4.25) has three important features. First, it corresponds to
the RBC model of section 4.a. Second, it exhibits a block recursive struc-
ture between the real and monetary sectors. Third, implementing Sims's
procedures for orthogonalizing the covariance matrix of the innovations
in a bivariate VAR by placing Mny, beforewoulduncover the true
orthogonal shocks of interest. It is worth emphasizing that the justifica-
tion for the ordering of the variables in this example depends critically
on the assumed pattern of Granger-causality results. For the RBC model
in section 4.a, imposing the Granger noncausality of output by money
identifies the parameters of the matrix Thereis no natural way to
separate the identification offromthe specification of the structure in
this dynamic model.
Recall that the findings in table 4.1 provide little evidence that is
Granger caused by Therefore,consistent with the previous
discussion, we implemented Sims's procedure for decomposing the vari-
ance of by placing before +Allof the variance de-
compositions are for forty-eight-month-ahead forecast errors (T =48).
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rors.6 Notice that for all the sample periods considered the innovation in
+accountsfor very little of the variance of In four of
the five sample periods considered the percentage of the variance of
explained by innovations to is within one standard error of
95 percent. Even in the sample period 1959:2—1983 :6, where
Granger causes at the 5 percent level, the percentage of the vari-
ance of accounted for by innovations in Mny, is within one stan-
dard error of 90 percent. Viewed as a whole, the empirical results
emerging from the bivariate time series analysis yield very little evidence
against the weak RBC
In section 5 we analyze VARs that indude additional variables as a
check on the robustness of the qualitative findings from the empirical
analysis of the bivariate VARs. In decomposing the variance of the growth
rate of output we proceed under the null hypothesis imposed by the
strong RBC hypothesis that there is a block recursive structure between
real and nominal variables.
5. Interpreting the Evidence from Vector Autoregressions
Much of the recent empirical evidence that has been used to support or
refute RBC models has come from studying vector autoregressive or
moving average representations of the variables comprising the models.
See, for example, Sargent (1976), Sims (1980a, 1980b), King and Plosser
(1984), Altug (1985), and Bernanke (1985). In this section we examine the
empirical evidence from multivariate VARs in light of the discussion in
section 4, using monthly data for the postwar U.S. economy.
At the outset of this discussion it is important to explore in detail the
role of detrending in the empirical analysis. As noted in section 3,
eral authors have documented the sensitivity of the results from estima-
ting unconstrained VARs to the assumptions about trends. At the same
time, previous studies have virtually ignored the fact that the trends are
determined both by the specification of the underlying uncertainty in
the economy andthestructure of the economic model itself. Therefore,
6. Standard errorsofall variance decompositions reported in this paper were computed
using the Monte Carlo procedure described in the RATS manual, page 17-3. Let b denote
the estimated VAR coefficient vector and let V denote the estimated covariance matrix of
the residuals in the VAR. Suppose that the VAR disturbances are i.i.d. and normally dis-
tributed. Then the posterior distribution of (b,V) is Normal-Wishart (see Zeilner
(1971)). Two hundred draws were taken from this distribution and the variance decom-
position of the 48-month-ahead forecast error implied by each draw was calculated. The
reported standard error is the square root of the sample variance of the estimated vari-
ance decompositions from the two hundred simulations.120 EICHENBAUM & SINGLETON
how one detrends is in general not independent of one's view about the
structure of the economy. This observation represents an additional rea-
son why it is not possible to embark on an empirical analysis of business
cycle models using VARs without implicitly or explicitly restricting the
class of models being investigated. We briefly illustrate the nature of
these restrictions using the models of section 3.
Different specifications of preferences and technologies, as well as
the laws of motion for the exogenous shocks, will in general lead one to
consider different autoregressive representations of the data. For in-
stance, had we started with quadratic preferences and technologies, a
linear representation of the levels of the variables, instead of their log-
arithms, would have emerged from the model. The question of whether
trends are deterministic or stochastic would then have been addressed
to the levels of the variables. Rather than working out in detail some
of the many possible time-series representations that might emerge
from alternative specifications of preferences and technologies, we con-
tinue to focus on the log-linear representation that emerges from the
model in section 3. Even holding fixed the specifications of technology
and preferences, it turns out that many possible trend specifications may
arise in our model from alternative specifications of the structure of
uncertainty.
To see this, it is convenient to work with a special case of the monetary
model given by equations (4.9) and (4.10). Suppose the monetary policy
rule is given by
=p-'+ (5.1,)
There is no deep economic significance to having monetary growth de-
pend on the intermediate good. This specification allows us to make our
points without extensive additional calculations using alternative sped-
fications of the model. Substituting equation (5.1) into equation (3.21)
gives (ignoring constants):
=(1— -+ (a — + €nO, — (5.2)
The expressions (3.22)and(3.23) for and respectively,are
unchanged. Notice that the coefficient on -inequation (5.2) is de-
termined both by the specifications of the storage technology for the in-
termediate good and the monetary feedback rule. If p < 0, then enx,
will be an explosive process and so will and In this case, nei-
ther the removal of a deterministic polynomial trend or flrst-differencing
will render the logarithm of output stationary! Similar examples ofReal Business Cycles121
potentially explosive processes for output are easily constructed by re-
laxing the assumption of independent taste and technology shocks.
Also, we conjecture that an explosive output process may well emerge in
models with increasing returns to scale in production. For instance,
some specifications of learning-by-doing might generate such an increas-
ing returns to scale technology.
If, on the other hand, 2 >p>0,then the trend in will be deter-
mined by the properties of €nO,, For instance, if a subset of
these variables exhibits linear deterministic trends and the other vari-
ables are stationary stochastic processes, then the logarithms of output,
consumption, and the price of the intermediate good will also exhibit lin-
ear trends. An assumption like this must implicitly underlie the com-
mon practice of removing linear trends. This result depends critically on
the specification (5.1) of the money supply rule. If p =0,then removing
linear trends from will not .render these variables sta-
tionary (see below). It would be necessary in this model to adopt an en-
tirely different specification of the storage technology to preserve the
linear trend assumption.
If 2 >p>0and and are all stationary, then eny,
will also be stationary. At least for the postwar period, the evidence
seems not to support this assumption about trends.
Finally, returning to the original specification of the model, if p =0,
then there is a unit root in the process for If the technology shock
enx, also has a unit root and env1 and are stationary processes, then
and Mnw, are all stationary stochastic processes. This case
is of particular interest since Prescott (1986) has argued that the technol-
ogy shock in his model approximately follows a random walk. Also,
Altug (1985) found that the estimated autoregressive parameter in her
time-series representation of the technology shock was essentially unity.
Third, Nelson and Plosser (1982) have argued that many real macroeco-
nomic time series must be differenced to induce stationarity. In our work
we consider only the possible need to first-difference output. However,
the need for higher order differencing could be justified by introducing
unit roots into the €nv, or processes.
With these observations in mind, we turn next to an empirical analysis
of monthly data for the postwar period. Let S7 denote a k XIvector of
variables observed by the econometrician. In light of our previous dis-
cussion regarding trends, we assume thatis related to the k XIco-
variance stationary stochastic process, S,. via one of the following two
relations:
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or
—-= (5.3b)
where g(t) is a scalar valued deterministic function of time and A is a
kxk matrix of constants, andhas the autoregressive representation
(4.11). As before, we partition the vectoras
S, —r''i
— LU'2ti'
whereis a jx1 vector of real quantity variables andis a (k —f)
x1 vector of relative prices and nominal variables.
Initially, we address the question of whether nominal aggregates have
predictive power for aggregate real output, once lagged outputs are ac-
counted for. Trivariate VARs, induding measures of aggregate real out-
put, the rate of inflation, and the stock of money were examined. That is,
= iTs, (5.5)
wheredenotes the rate of inflation between time t —1and time t.
(Recall that +chosen at date t.) Similar VARs were studied by Sims
(1980a) and Litterman and Weiss (1985). In order to allow comparisons
with the latter study, the components ofwere taken to be monthly
versions of the data used by Litterman and Weiss over the sample period
1949:2—1983:6. The variablewas measured as industrial production,
M,was measured as Ml, andwasmeasured as the monthly change
in the logarithm of the consumer price index less shelter. Seasonally ad-
justed versions of the money, price, and output series were used.
Recall that Sims and Litterman and Weiss estimated their VARs using
levels of variables. Sims does not discuss the trend issue, while Litter-
man and Weiss note that their findings are largely insensitive to whether
or not linear trends are removed. Their approach amounts to running a
VAR using data onrather thanHere we investigate the sensitivity
of Litterman and Weiss's Granger-causality findings to both changes in
the sample period, and the removal of linear deterministic trends or first-
differencing the data.
Five sample periods were considered: 1949:2—1983:6; 1952: 1—1979:
12; 1952:1—1983:6; 1959:2—1979:12; and 1959:2—1983:6. All VARs in-
cluded twelve lagged values of each variable and a constant. Table 5.1
displays the test results for the null hypotheses that the coefficients on
lagged values ofand and HM,respectively)in the eny,
equation are zero in the context of the trivariate VAR for(equationReal Business Cycles• 123
(5.5)).The null hypothesis HM is rejected at the 1 percent level for the
sample periods 1949:2—1983:6 and 1959:2—1983:6, but not for the other
three sample periods. The null hypothesis I-Ia is rejected at the 1 percent
level only for the period 1959:2—1979:12. There is substantially more
evidence against the null hypothesis HM at the 5 percent level; HM is re-
jected at this level for all five sample periods.
Table 5.2 reports the corresponding tests for withgiven by
(5.3a). The matrix A was chosen to be the 3 x 3 identity matrix, and the
function g(t) was given by
g(t) =a+bt.(5.6)
Thus the inputs into the VAR were the linearly detrended values of
ir, and ertM, +denotedby €ny, ir, and respectively.Let
denote the null hypothesis that the coefficients on lagged values
of €nM+(rr)in the eny; equation are zero. It is interesting that the
strongest evidence against from the post-1959 sample periods.
For these subperiods,is rejected at the 1 percent level. The null
hypothesisis not rejected at the 5 percent significance level for any of
the subperiods.
The results of table 5.2 are based on a decomposition of the move-
ments ininto secular and cyclical components. Secular movements































0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ir, .414 .201 .578 .009 .127
mM,41 .003 .019 .017 .032 .006
a. Entries give the percentage of the forecast error in the error variance accounted for by the orthogon-
ahzed innovations in the listed variables. The order of orthogonalization is as listed. Standard errors are
displayed in parentheses.
I,. denotes the in of industrial output at time t, ir, denotes the inflation rate between time f—i and
time f. and lnM,+1 denotes the In of the stock of money at time 1.
c.Probabilityvalues for the null hypothesis that the coefficients of lagged values of variable x in the
regression equation for my, are zero.124• EICHENBAUM & SINGLETON
were modeled as deterministic functions of time. A number of authors
like Nelson and Plosser (1982) have argued, on statistical grounds, that
many macroeconomic time series display stochastic rather than deter-
ministic time trends. Given the weak power of existing statistical tests
for detecting the presence of unit roots in time-series processes, it is not
clear that these issues can be settled on purely statistical grounds (see for
example the discussion of Nelson and Plosser (1982) in McCallum
(1985)). However, we are sympathetic to the possibility that a variety of
aggregate time series are members of what Nelson and Plosser (1982) call
the dass of difference stationary stochastic processes. Moreover, several
of the models in sections 3 and 4 are consistent with the presence of a
unit root in the autoregressive component of the time-series representa-
tion for the logarithm of real output. Therefore, we reestimated the tn-
variate VARs, allowing for the possibility that the data display stochastic
trends. However, we made no attempt to decompose the movements in
real output (or the other components ofinto secular and cyclical com-
ponents, because we did not wish to impose the a priori restriction that
nominal disturbances affect only the cyclical component of real output.
Table 5.3 displays the results of testing the null hypotheses that the
coefficients on lagged values of andin the equation
and respectively) are zero. The trivariate VARswereestimated
• using observations onwithandrelated via equation (5.3b). The
Table 5.2 DECOMPOSITION OF VARIANCEOF
49,2—83,652,1—79,1252,1—83,659,2—79,1259,2—83,6
lny?tb 83 45 62 29 42
ire'
(10) (12) (12) (9)
6 36 22 48
(11)
25
• (8) (13) (12) (14) (13)
11 19 17 23
(7) (10) (9) (10)
33
(10)
Probability values for the null hypothesis Hi"
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ire' .912 .246 .703 .090 .342
.171 .010 .117 .004 .001
a. Entries give the percentage of the forecast error in the error variance accourtted for by the orthogon.
alized innovations in the listed variables. The order of orthogonalization is as listed. Standard errors are
displayed in parentheses.
b. denotesthedetrended In level of industrial output at time t,denotes the detrended rate of
inflation between time t—l and time I, and in denotesthe detrended In level of the stock of
money at time f.
c. Probability values for the null hypothesis that the coefficients of lagged values of variable x' in the
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matrix A was chosen to be the 3 x 3 identity matrix so thatis simply
equal to A striking feature of the results is that neither or
Ha,. is rejected at the 5 percent level for any of the postwar sample peri-
ods. These results stand in sharp contrast to those reported in tables 5.1
and 5.2.
To summarize this portion of our empirical analysis, the test results
were most sensitive to changes in the sample period when the VARs
were estimated using data that were not detrended in any way (as in
Sims (1980a) and Litterman and Weiss (1985)) and least sensitive when
the VARs were estimated using flrst-differenced data. In addition, the
strongest evidence against the null hypothesis that real output is ex-
ogenous with respect to measures of inflation and the stock of money
was obtained when the VARs were estimated using nondetrended data.
There is no evidence against this null hypothesis from VARs estimated
using flrst-differenced data.
Next, 'we examine the consequences of adding asset returns to the
joint time-series representation for output, inflation, and money. Sims
(1980a) and Litterman and Weiss (1985) report that the role of money in
VARs is very sensitive to the inclusion of rates of return on Treasury bill
securities. For this reason, several VARs that included the ex post real
value-weighted return on stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange,
and the ex post real rate of return on one-month Treasury bills,
were estimated. Real rates of return were studied instead of nominal re-
Table 5.3 DECOMPOSITION OF VARIANCE OF
49,2—83,652,1—79,1252,1—83,659,2—79,1259,2—83,6
93 92 93 86 85









0.00 0.00 0.00 0,00
.979 .937 .957 .197 .319
.314 .259 .421 .238 .724
a. Entries give the percentage of the forecast error in the error variance accounted for by the orthogon.
alized innovations in the listed variables. The order of orthogonalization is as listed. Figures in paren-
theses are corresponding standard errors.
b.iMny,denotes the growth rate of industrial output at time t, denotes the growth rate in inflation
rate at time t,and denotes the growth rate in the stock of money at tune t.
c. Probabilityvalues for the null hypothesis that the coefficients on lagged values of variablein the
regression equation for are zero.126- EICHENBAIJM & SINGLETON
turns, because the nominal rate of return on Treasury bills,displays a
marked trend in the postwar period. This trend is far less pronounced
for the real rate of return,
The reasons for including stock returns in the empirical analysis are
threefold. First, we agree with Fischer and Merton (1984) that macro-
economists have unduly neglected the role of the stock market as a
determinant of aggregate output. Second, there are good theoretical
reasons to believe that stock returns are useful statistical predictors of
real output. Changes in stock prices reflect both revised expectations
about future corporate earnings and revisions in the discount rate at
which these expected earnings are capitalized. Revisions in both of these
variables may be induced by the shocks impinging on output. Third, a
number of authors, including Doan, Litterman, and Sims (1983), report
that stock returns are, in fact, important indicators of movements in real
output.
In estimating the VARs with asset returns, attention was restricted to
the post-1959 period, because tables 5.1 and 5.2 suggest that this period
was the least likely to be consistent with RBC theories. Table 5.4 reports









































air, .659 .970 Airs .758 .628
.108 .127 .633 .282
a. Entries give the percentage of the forecast error in the error variance accounted for by the orthogon-
alized innovations in the listed variables. The order of orthogonalization is as listed. Figures in paren-
theses are correspondingstandarderrors.
b. denotes thegrowth rate of industrial output at time t. denotes the growth rate in inflation
rate at time t, denotes the growth rate in the in of the stock of money at time t,denotes the ex
postrealrate of return on Treasury securities at time t.anddenotes the real rate of return on stocks at
time t.
c.Probability values for the null hypothesis that the coefficients of lagged values of variablein the
regression equation for are zero.Real Business 127
results from four-variate VARs including MnM,+and
Air,, +In neither of the two sample periods can we
reject at the 5 percent level the null hypotheses HaM,or How-
ever, the null hypothesiscan be rejected at the 1 percent level for the
period 1959:2—1979:12.
Table 5.5 displays the results from four-variate VARs including {€ny,',
ir,€nM+and {€ny,ir, £nM +Somewhat surprisingly, only
lagged values of eny; helped predict future values of eny for the sample
periods examined.
Table 5.6 displays results from five-variate VARs including ri',
Air,, MnM,+and {eny, ri',ir,', €nM,'+j.Only lagged values of
Aeny, help predict future values of Aeny, at the 1 percent level. Similarly,
only lagged values of help predict €ny at the 1 percent level. How-
ever, there is some evidence that ex post real stock returns have predic-
five power for both Mny, and eny in the period 1959: 2-. 1979: 12. As
with the trivariate VARs, there is somewhat more evidence that nominal
aggregates help predict real variables when detrended data are used, but
overall there is very little evidence of predictive power for nominal van-













































sr,' .096 .408 ir,' .612 .194
mM,41' .074 .060 mM,41' .224 .060
a. Entries give the percentage of the forecast error in the error variance accounted for by the orthogon.
alized innovations in the listed variables. The order of orthogonalizatiort is as listed. Figures in paren-
theses are corresponding standard errors.
b. my,' denotes the detrended In level of Industrial output at tune t, ir,'denotesthe detrended rate of
inflation rate at time t, InM,+, denotes the detrended In level of the stock of money at time t,denotes
the ex post real rate of return on Treasury securities at time t, anddenotesthe real rate of return on
stocks at time t.
c.Probabilityvalues for the null hypothesis that the coefficients of lagged values of variable x in the
regression equation for by,' are zero.128 EICHENBAUM & SINGLETON
ables. Finally, table 5.7 reports the results of replacing real rates of return
by first differences of nominal rates of return and linearly detrended
nominal returns. The qualitative conclusions from these tests are essen-
tially the same as those from using real returns.
The results using differenced data provide little support for the view
that monetary policy actions were important determinants of real output
over the sample periods considered. The absence of Granger causality
from money to output suggests that exogenous policy shocks were not a
major source of output variability. Overall, the pattern of results from the
VARs are not inconsistent with an RBC interpretation of the postwar ag-
gregate time-series data.
There is perhaps one puzzling feature of these results. Recall from the
discussion in section 4.b that monetary growth might be expected to






(7) (6) (6) (6)
24 24 18 26
(6) (5) (9) (10)
3 6 3 23
(3) (5) (4) (11)
4 4 ir,' 16 16
(3) (3) (9) (7)
AInM,41 3 3 mM,4,' 46 12
(2) (2) (11) (7)
Probability values for Probability values for H1'
A.lny, 0.00 .006 my,' .000 .000
.051 .011 .071 .013
.554 .800 .053 .217
.627 .857 ir,' .049 .067
.493 .266 .295 .047
a. Entries give the percentageof theforecasterrorin theerror variance accounted for by the orthogon-
alizedinnovations in the listed variables. The order of orthogonalization is as listed. Figures in paren.
theses are standard errors.
Ii.Amy,denotes the growth rate of industrial output at time t,Air,denotes the growth rate in inflation
rate at time t.AInMdenotesthe growth rate in the stock of money at time t,y,'denotes the tie-
trended in level of industrial output at time t,mM'denotesthe detrended In level of the stock of
money,denotes the ex post real rate of return in Treasury securities at time I. ir,'denotesthe de-
trended level of inflation, and rm denotes the real rate of return on stocks at time t.
c.Probabilityvalues for the null hypothesis that the coefficients of lagged values of variables Ax and x
in theregression equations for Ainy, and my,' respectively are zero.Real Business Cycles129
Granger cause output growth in an RBC model when the number of ag-
gregate real shocks impinging on the economy is large relative to the
number of real variables inHere we have found little evidence that
+,Grangercauses in several multivariate VARs including
bivariate representations. At the same time, stock returns evidently do
Granger cause which suggests that there were at least two sigrufl-
cant aggregate real shocks impinging on the postwar economy. Money is
evidently not proxying for unobserved taste or technology shocks in
these VARs, even though the number of real shocks exceeds the dimen-
sion ofThese findings raise interesting questions about the links be-
tween money and output in the U.S. economy that warrant further




,Mny,b 75 72 my,' 18 23
(6) (6) (6) (6)
10 12 18 25
(4) (4) (9) (8)
7 7 12 16
(4) (4) (9) (8)
4 4 ir,' 7 24
(3) (3) (6) (9)
4 46 12
(3) (3) (13) (8)





.416 .348 Ri" .049 .218
.463 .584 ir,' .213 .200
.240 .238 M,+1' .295 .047
a. Entries give the percentage of the forecast error in the error variance accountedforby the orthogort.
alized innovations in the listed variables. The order of orthogonalization is as listed. Figures in paren-
theses are corresponding standard errors.
b. denotes the growth rate of industrial output at time 1,stir, denotesthe growth rate in inflation
rate at time t, denotes the growth rate in the stock of money at time t. my,' denotes the de.
minded In level of industrial output,denotesthe detrended level of inflation, mM'denotesthe
detrended in level of the stock of money, denotes the first difference of the monthly nominal return
on Treasury securities at time t,denotes the detrertded monthly nominal rate of return on Treasury
securities at time I, denotes the first difference of the nominal rate of return on stocks at time t and
Rl' denotes the monthly detrended nominal rate of return on stocks at time t.
c. Probabilityvalues for the null hypotheses that the coefficients of lagged values of the variables Lx
and x' in the regression equation for and y,'. respectively, are zero.EICHENBAUM & SINGLETON
investigation and that are not easily addressed within the context of
many recent monetary models or the model in section 3.
Proceeding under the null hypothesis that a real business cycle view is
correct, the variance decompositions of output were also calculated.
Sims's method for orthogonalizing the error terms from the VAR was
used, with real variables appearing before the nominal variables in the
vectorUnder this ordering, the innovations in the real variables are
interpreted as linear combinations of the innovations to agents' prefer-
ence and technology shocks. In all of the decompositions we chose an
ordering of variables in which output appeared first. It would be equally
consistent with the RBC model of section 4.a to choose an ordering in
which either of the two asset returns appeared prior to output. In prac-
tice, we encountered very little sensitivity to permutations of the order-
ings within the real block S11. In part this reflects the fact that monthly
data were used. For monthly data, the contemporaneous correlations
among the innovations in the VAR are small,
All reported variance decompositions are based on 48-month-ahead
forecast errors. Table 5.1 reports the decomposition of the variance of
eny, based upon trivariate VARs inducing and There-
ported variance decompositions of are sensitive to changes in the
sample period. For example, in the sample period 1949:2—1983:6, the
innovations to 1 account for 34 and 25 percent, respectively,
of the error variance of When the sample period is 1952:1—1979:12
these percentages are 9 and 64, respectively. Most dramatically, in the
sample period 1959:2—1979:12, innovations inaccount for 79 percent
of the forecast error variance of while monetary innovations ac-
count for only 9 percent of the forecast error variance in €flYt.
Thedecompositions of the variance of output in table 5.2, which are
based on trivariate VARs including €ny, ire' and €nM+arealso quite
sensitive to changes in the sample period. Again innovations in the infla-
tion rate account for the largest proportion of the variance of output in
the post-1959 period. However, comparing tables 5.1 and 5.2 we see that
innovations in the inflation rate play a relatively more important role in
the variance decomposition of output based on VARs estimated with
nondetrended data. Nevertheless, nominal variables accounted for fairly
large proportions of the variance of inall of the sample periods.
The decompositions of the variance of output reported in table 5.3 are
based on trivariate VARs which included and +
Theseresults differ in two important respects from those reported in
tables 5.1 and 5.2. First, the results display very little sensitivity to
changes in the sample period and the reported standard errors are
smaller. Second, innovations in and +accountfor only aReal Business Cycles131
small proportion of the error variance of Overall the most un-
favorable sample periods from the point of view of RBC theories are the
post-1959 periods.
Consider next the decompositions of the variance of output based on
VARs that included asset return data. As before, attention is restricted to
the post-1959 period. Table 5.4 displays the decomposition of the vari-
ance of output based on four-variate VARs including ri',
+and MnM,+Asin table 5.3, the reported
decompositions are largely insensitive to changes in the sample period.
In both cases the output innovations account for a large proportion of
the variance of Mny1. Innovations in rr account for a very small propor-
tion of the variance of Mny,, while innovations inaccount for approx-
imately 25 percent of the variance of
Table 5.6 reports the variance decomposition of Mny1 based on a five-
variate VAR including {Mnyt, ri', +j.The results are again
insensitive to the choice of the sample period. Together, innovations in
real variables account for over 90 percent of the variance of the growth
rate in output. Innovations in and +playan insignificant
role in the decomposition. Both tables 5.4 and 5.6 indicate that ex post
real stock returns play a far more important role that ex post real Trea-
sury bill returns in the time-series behavior of This is reflected
both in the Granger causality tests and the decomposition of the variance
of
Finally, table 5.6 displays the decomposition of the variance of output
based on a five-variate VAR which included {€ny, ri', enM;+
Innovationsin ir,'andenM+ for a significant proportion of the
variance of eny. However, the results are sensitive to the choice in the
sample period. For example, enM+ for 46 percent of the vari-
ance of eny when the sample period is 1959:2—1983 :6, but only 12 per-
cent when the sample period is 1959:2—1979:12. A similar instability of
the variance decompositions is displayed in table 5.5 for the four-variate
VARs, including {eny, €nM+and{eny,€nir,
andin table 5.7 for the five-variate VARs which included {thy,', Ri', Ri",
ir, €nM,' +i}. Notsurprisingly, standard errors are larger for the decom-
positions based on linearly detrended data than those based on the dif-
ferenced data.
6. Concluding Remarks
Astriking finding from our empirical analysis is that, for all sample peri-
ods considered and for various multivariate VARs, lagged values of the
monetary growth rate are not helpful in predicting the current and fu-EICHENBAUM & SINGLETON
ture growth rates of output, after conditioning on the other variables, in
the VARs. Interpreted within the context of the monetary model of sec-
tion 3, these results suggest that exogenous shocks to the monetary
growth rate were not an important independent source of variation in
output growth during the postwar period in the U.S. More precisely, sta-
tistical representations of the monetary growth rate suggest that the
monetary policy rule involves feedback on both lagged monetary growth
and output. This observation, combined with the dependence of output
on monetary growth through our transactions technology, suggests that
if monetary shocks were an mportant source of output variability, then
monetary growth would have Granger caused the growth rate of output
in VARs. Adding sticky wages and prices, overlapping nominal con-
tracts, or entering money directly in agents' utility functions seems
likely to reinforce the conclusion that monetary growth will Granger
cause output growth if exogenous shocks to the money supply were an
important source of business cycle fluctuation.
We hasten to add that the design of our empirical analysis is such that
infrequent monetary shocks that had an important effect on output
growth may not have been detected by our statistical procedures. All of
the sample periods examined covered several different political admin-
istrations, and in several cases there were significant changes in the
structure of financial institutions. Additionally, specific events that are
widely viewed as being monetary in nature occurred during sample peri-
ods that may also have included numerous real shocks. Put differently,
our results do not rule out the possibility that particular movements in
output were largely due to monetary shocks. Our results only indicate
that such shocks were not sufficiently frequent and large to be statis-
tically significant over the entire sample period. More thorough study of
specific events seems worthwhile.
There are several other considerations that we feel make a real busi-
ness cycle interpretation of our findings premature. First, the empirical
results are not insensitive to the assumptions about the nature of trends.
The vi.rtual absence of Granger causality from money to output was ob-
tained when both of these variables were flrst-differenced. In contrast,
when linear deterministic trends were removed from the logarithms of
output and money, there was much more evidence that money Granger
caused output. Even with linear trends, however, the evidence was
mixed. For the sample period 1959 :2 through 1983 :6, and in a five-
variate VAR including real stock and bond returns, money innovations
accounted for 46 percent of the variation in detrended output. (Interest-
ingly, this finding is not consistent with Sims's finding that monetary
shocks explain little of output variation in the presence of interest rates.)Real Business Cycles133
For the sample period 1959:2 through 1979: 12, monetary innovations
accounted for 12 percent of the variation in detrended output. A com-
parison of the results for these two sample periods suggests that mone-
tary shocks may have been important for output fluctuation during the
early 1980s. But the standard errors for the estimated variance decom-
positions are quite large and detrended money did not Granger cause
detrended output for the longer sample period. Also, recall that money
accounted for an insignificant percentage of the variation in output over
both sample periods when these series were time-differenced.
We wish to reemphasize the potential importance of investigating the
role of technological factors in generating business cycles within models
that explicitly incorporate monetary exchange. Market structures in
monetary economies are very different from the market structures that
have been assumed in the literature on real business cycle models. Our
example economies show that one could be seriously misled in charac-
terizing the structure of a monetary economy, despite obtaining a good
statistical fit using a real business cycle model.
Finally, it is perhaps possible to reconcile our empirical findings with
modern Keynesian or non-Keynesian monetary business cycle theories.
However, to accomplish this reconciliation, these models must be for-
mulated so as to be consistent with both the findings that money growth
does not Granger cause output growth and that money growth depends
on lagged output growth and money growth. We conjecture that in con-
structing such models researchers will be led to reexamine the relative
importance of various channels through which monetary factors affect
real economic activity. In particular, the importance of financial institu-
tions in the propagation of real shocks may be more pronounced in
monetary models in which the structure of financial contracts emerges
from a more thorough treatment of frictions.
We have benefited from helpful discussions with Lars Hansen, Bennett McCallum, Allan
Meltzer, Dan Peled, Michael Woodford, and our discussants Robert Barro and Greg Man-
kiw. Research assistance was provided by Kun-hong Kim and David Marshall.
REFERENCES
Altug, S. 1985. Gestation lags and the business cycle: An empirical analysis. Uni-
versity of Minnesota. Manuscript.
Bernanke, B. S. 1985. Alternative explanations of the money-income correlation.
Carnegie-Rochester Conference on Public Policy, ed. K. Brunner and A. Meltzer.
Forthcoming.
Bernanke, B. S., and M. Gertler. 1985. Banking in general equilibrium. NBER
Working Paper no. 1647.
Blanchard, 0., and M. Watson. 1984. Are business cycles all alike? NBER Work-
ing Paper no. 1392.EICHENBAUM & SINGLETON
Cootey, T. F., and S. F. Leroy. 1985. Atheoretical macroeconometrics: A critique.
Journal of Monetary Economics 16:283—308.
Doan, T., R. Litterman, and C. Sims. 1983. Forecasting and conditional projec-
tion using realistic prior distributions. NBER Working Paper no. 1202.
Eichenbaum, M. S., L. P. Hansen, and K. J. Singleton. 1985. A time series analy-
sis of representative agent models of consumption and leisure choice under
uncertainty. Carnegie-Mellon University. Manuscript.
Fischer, S. 1977. Long-term contracts, rational expectations, and the optimal
money supply rule. Journal of Political Economy 85:191—205.
Fischer, S., and R. C. Merton. 1984. Macroeconomics and finance: The role of the
stock market. In Essays on macroeconomic implications of financial and labor markets
and political processes, ed. K. Brunner and A. Meltzer. Carnegie-Rochester Se-
ries on Public Policy, Vol. 21:57—108.
Garber, P. M., and R. G. King. 1983. Deep structural excavation? A critique of
Euler equation methods. NBER Technical Working Paper no. 31.
Hamilton, J. D. 1983. Oil and the macroeconomy since World War II. Journal of
Political Economy 91: 228—48.
Hansen, C. 1985. Indivisible labor and the business cycle. Journal of Monetary
Economics 16:309—28.
Kang, H. 1985. The effects of detrending in Granger-causality tests. Journal of
Business and Economic Statistics 3:344—49.
Kareken, J. H., and N. Wallace, eds. 1980. Models of Monetary Economies. Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
King, R., and C. Plosser. 1984. Money, credit, and prices in a real business cycle
economy. American Economic Review 74:363—80.
1985. Nominal Surprises, Real Factors and Propagation Mechanisms,
Department of Economics, University of Rochester.
Kydland, F. E. 1984. Labor-force heterogeneity and the business cycle. In Essays
on macroeconomic implications of financial and labor markets and political processes,
ed. K. Brunner and A. Meltzer. Carnegie-Rochester Series on Public Policy,
Vol. 21:173—208.
Kydland, F. E., and E. F. Prescott. 1982. Time to build and aggregate fluctuations.
Econometrica 50:1345—70.
Litterman, R., and L. Weiss. 1985. Money, real interest rates, and output: A re-
interpretation of postwar U.S. data. Econometrica 53:129—56.
Long, J., and C. Plosser. 1983. Real business cycles. Journal of Political Economy
91:39—69.
Lucas, R. E., Jr. 1980. Equilibrium in a pure currency economy. Economic Inquiry
18: 203—20.
1984. Money in a theory of finance. In Essays on macroeconomic implica-
tions of financial and labor markets and political processes, ed. K. Brunner and A.
Meltzer. Carnegie-Rochester Series on Public Policy, Vol. 21:9—46.
1985. Models of business cycles. University of Chicago. Manuscript.
Lucas, R. E., Jr., and N. L. Stokey. 1983. Optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an
economy without capital. Journal of Monetary Economics 12:55—93.
1984. Money and interest in a cash-in-advance economy. CMSEMS Dis-
cussion Paper no. 628, Northwestern University.
Mankiw, N. G., J. J. Rotemberg, and L. H. Summers. 1985. Intertemporal substi-
tution in macroeconomics. Quarterly Journal of Economics C:225—52.
McCallum, B. T. 1977. Price-level stickiness and the feasibility of monetary stabili-
zation policy with rational expectations. Journal of Political Economy 85:627—34.Real Business CycI es135
• 1983a. A reconsiderationof Sims' evidence concerning monetarism. Eco-
nomic Letters13:167—71.
1983b. The role of overlapping-generations models in monetary econom-
ics. In Money, Monetary Policy and Financial Institutions, ed. K. Bruriner and A.
Meltzer. Carnegie-Rochester Series on Public Policy, Vol. 18:9—44.
•1985. On 'real' and 'sticky-price' theories of the business cycle. Car-
negie-Mellon University. Manuscript.
Mehra, R., and E. C. Prescott. 1985. The equity premium: A puzzle. Journal of
Monetary Economics 15:145—62.
Miron, J. A. 1985. Seasonal fluctuations and the life cycle-permanent income
model of consumption. Manuscript.
Modigliani, F. 1958. New development on the oligopoly frontier. Journal of Politi-
cal Economy 66:215—33.
1977. The monetarist controversy or, should we forsake stabilization
policies? American Economic Review 67:1—19.
Nelson, C. R., and C. I. Plosser. 1982. Trends and random walks in macro-
economic time series: Some evidence and implications. Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics 10:129—62.
Prescott, E. C. 1986. Theory ahead of business cyde measurement. Carnegie-
Rochester Conference on Public Policy, ed. A. Meltzer and K. S. Brunner. Forth-
coming.
Sargent, T. J. 1976. A classical macroecoriometric model for the United States.
Journal of Political Economy 84:207—37.
Sims, C. A. 1980a. Comparison of interwar and postwar business cycles: Mone-
tarism reconsidered. American Economic Review 70:250—57.
1980b. Macroeconomics and reality. Econometrica 48:1—48.
Svensson, L. E. 0. 1985. Money and asset prices in a cash-in-advance economy.
Journal of Political Economy 93:919—44.
Taylor, J. 1980. Aggregate dynamics and staggered contracts. Journal of Political
Economy 88:1—23.
Townsend, R. 1982. Asset return anomalies: A choice-theoretic, monetary expla-
nation. Carnegie-Mellon University. Manuscript.




The University of Rochester
My expectation was that this paper would deal with the empirical role of
real business cycle theories (henceforth RBC theories). In fact, the em-
pirical analysis focuses on the issue of whether variations in the quantity
of money (Ml) influence output. Apparently if the real effects of money
are strong (weak), the RBC theories are to be viewed as unimportant (im-
portant). Eichenbaum and Singleton conclude from monthly post—World136 BARRO
War II U.S. data that Ml is not a major causal factor for industrial produc-
tion, which, if correct, is an important fmding. But I do not see what this
result would say about the empirical significance of RBC theories. It
seems inadequate to conclude that whatever is not monetary (i.e., re-
lated to Ml) must be real in the sense of the real disturbances that appear
in RBC theories. Even if the monetarists are wrong. the realists may not
be right.
Consider as an example the model of Keynes's General Theory. The
model implies that variations in the quantity of money are relatively un-
important for the behavior of output and employment (because of a
peculiar-looking demand-for-money function). Yet the model contains
nominal rigidities, for wages at least, perhaps also for prices. The aggre-
gates of output and employment are determined inefficiently, in the
sense that (perceived) mutually advantageous trades do not occur. As a
consequence there is a desirable role for activist governmental policies,
especially of the fiscal variety. From a positive standpoint, the Keynesian
model says that the major driving element for business fluctuations is
animal spirits—that is, exogenous changes in optimism or pessimism by
business investors. (I doubt that animal spirits could ever be seen di-
rectly in the data.) These shifts are then multiplied by the endogenous
elements of the model—hence relatively small disturbances can create
substantial changes in output and employment.
For present purposes the important issue is not the empirical validity
of this fine theory; rather, the point is that data generated by this model
would accord with Eichenbaum and Singleton's finding that money has a
minor causal role in industrial production. Hence, they would look at
this data and find support for RBC theories (at least in the sense of failing
to reject such theories). Yet most economists would not regard the Key-
nesian model as an example of RBC theory—at least not the "equi-
librium"-style theory that is now popular.
The equilibrium versions of RBC theory focus on technological shifts
as key disturbances to the economy. These shifts could involve innova-
tions in technique, introduction of new products, changes in compara-
tive advantage across regions or countries, natural disasters, and so on.
The models can also accommodate shifts in preferences, although these
are generally regarded as less important. In any event, the economy re-
sponds efficiently to the various disturbances, taking account of mobility
costs, incomplete information, and the like. Although phenomena that
resemble aggregate business fluctuations can arise in these models,
there is no role for activist stabilization policies. (There would be the
usual issues of optimal taxation and provision of public goods.) Overall,
these kinds of models bear little resemblance to Keynes's General Theory.Comment 137
Some RBC models (such as Long and Plosser 1983) show that, given
some initiating real disturbances, it is possible to reproduce the standard
business cycle pattern with respect to persistence over time and co-
movements across industries. Also the endogenous response of inside
money (as in King and Plosser 1984) can explain some positive correla-
tion in the data between a monetary aggregate such as Ml and measures
of real economic activity. Further, variations in financial intermediation
can be modeled as one of the real disturbances that matters for output,
investment, and so on. This interpretation is consistent with Bernanke's
(1983) analysis of nonmonetary factors during the Great Depression.
That is, RBC theories are consistent with real effects from a collapse in
credit institutions.
Despite these favorable aspects, economists' main skepticism about
RBC theories reflects the doubt that real disturbances are large and fre-
quent enough to account for much of observed business fluctuations. It
is important to note here that RBC models—although they can account
for dispersion across industries and propagation over time—lack impor-
tant multipliers. Basically the models need big disturbances to get big
movements in output. Thus, I would have preferred the focus of Eichen-
baum and Singleton's empirical work to be on the question of whether
real shocks are large and frequent enough to account for a major part of
the business cycle. As a dividend, it would also be nice to identify some
of the initiating real disturbances with observable variables.
The events that got macroeconomists interested in real disturbances—
sometimes referred to as "supply shocks"—were the oil crises of 1973—
74 and 1979—80 (and presumably with the opposite sign for 1985—86).
Hamilton's (1983) detailed study finds a regular pattern whereby in-
creases in oil prices are followed by declines in real GNP. Remarkably,
this pattern applies even before the celebrated oil crises of recent years—.-
for example, to the Suez crisis of 1956—57 (which preceded the recession
of 1957—58) and to the Iranian nationalization of its oil fields in 1952—53
(which came before the recession of 1953—54). The evidence is especially
impressive because the changes in the (relative) price of oil can often be
related to observable, exogenous events.
An obvious question is why oil, and not an array of other commodi-
ties, as the source of supply shocks? The crises of 1973—74 and 1979—80
can be interpreted as exogenous changes in market structure that re-
duced the supply of a major input to production. In this respect the dis-
turbance would tend to lower world output, perhaps especially in the
short run when producers are motivated to adjust their capital stocks to
a new configuration of relative prices. (There would also be distribu-
tional effects on world income—but these may be less important for the138•BARRO
effectson production.) Disturbances that affect the supply of other in-
puts could also be important in principle, although they may be difficult
to isolate in the aggregate data. In any case it is unclear what general re-
search strategy to follow in applying the results for oil (or energy) to
other areas.
Lilien's (1982) approach to intersectoral shifts seemed promising be-
cause it avoided the need to isolate a detailed array of supply shocks. His
idea was that many—mostly unobservable—disturbances to technology
and preferences motivate reallocations of resources across sectors. Be-
cause of the costs of matching workers to new jobs and of accumulating
new types of capital, the transition tends to involve temporary reduc-
tions in aggregate production and employment. Also, the increase in job
separations leads to a temporary rise in the unemployment rate (which
shows up as more people searching for jobs). This theory has since been
extended by Topel and Weiss (1985) and Rogerson (1986).
Two attractions of the Lilien-style analysis were, first, that the disper-
sion of changes in employment and production across industrial sectors
seemed to be positively correlated with the overall unemployment rate (or
other measures of economic contraction), and second, that the method
did not require the isolation of observable supply shocks, such as oil
crises. But further empirical research brought out some problems. Abra-
ham and Katz (1986) showed that the correlation of Lilien's dispersion
variable with the business cyde could reflect purely aggregate distu.r-
bances that had differential effects on the various sectors. Also, models
that stress sectoral shifts imply that a high sectoral dispersion of changes
in production and employment would create high vacancies as well as
high unemployment. Hence this analysis predicts a positive relation be-
tween vacancies and unemployment, which Abraham and Katz show is
inconsistent with the evidence. (The negative association between vacan-
cies and unemployment is often called a Beveridge curve, although
given Lord Beveridge's work (1945) it is not clear why a curve should be
named after him.)
Loungani (1986) brings Out another problem with Lilien's analysis.
When the relative price of oil is held fixed, it turns out that there is no
remaining association between Lilien's dispersion variable and the un-
employment rate or other measures of aggregate business fluctuations.
Oil shocks would create a dispersion across sectors in the changes in
employment and production, and this dispersion may be part of the
story behind oil's effect on aggregate output. But Loungani's results show
that Lilien's method fails to isolate other, unobservable supply shocks
that were important in historical business cycles. Thus one major attrac-
tion of the sectoral approach seems to have been illusory. (As an aside,Comment 139
Loungani shows that there was an oil shock in 1920, which matches up
well with the sharp economic contraction in 1921. Apparently, oil shocks
were important even before oil was very important. But perhaps it is en-
ergy shocks that are being isolated, which accords with the significance
attached much earlier by Jevons (1865) to the supply of coal in Britain.)
My conclusion is that real business cycle theories represent promising
ideas for explaining business cycles. Given the weak state of alternative
ideas (such as animal spirits and monetary shocks), it would be a mis-
take to dispense too readily with this line of theory. But at this stage the
main empirical support for RBC theories concerns the role of oil shocks.
Thus, the available evidence is not very satisfying.
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Comment
N. GREGORY MANKIW
Harvard University and NBER
Real business cycle theory is one of the currently "hot" topics in mac-
roeconomics, especially among those who live closer to lakes than to
oceans. Eichenbaum and Singleton take on the difficult, but obviously
very important, question of whether the economic fluctuations observed
during the past forty years can be reconciled with these theories. In140 MANKIW
particular, they examine the interaction between the variation in the
quantity of money and fluctuations in real economic activity, using the
now-standard techniques of vector autoregression, Granger causality,
and variance decomposition. The primary empirical finding, which in
light of Sims's celebrated work comes as a complete surprise, is that
money appears not to Granger cause output, even in bivariate systems.
Vector autoregressions and Granger causality tests are, to my mind,
difficult to interpret. Eichenbaum and Singleton's analysis, however, in
contrast to much previous empirical work of this kind, is not completely
atheoretical. They begin with a simple theory, in particuiar a model in
which money enters by virtue of a cash-in-advance constraint. They
show that money will, in general, matter in this economy. If, however,
fluctuations in money are relatively small, then a real business cyde
model could provide a good approximation to this monetary economy.
While the model provides one framework within which the empirical
work can be interpreted, Eichenbaum and Singleton argue that the ab-
sence of Granger causality from money to output appears inconsistent
with more complex monetary models as well, including those in which
wages and prices are sticky.
The central question of the article, "Does Money Matter?", is of course
a long-standing one. The novelty of the article is the answer. While Eich-
enbaum and Singleton prudently refrain from jumping to the broad con-
dusion that money does not matter, they do argue, in essence, that money
has not mattered, at least over the past forty years, and that their fmdings
are problematic for many prominent theories of the business cycle.
The question for a commentator of course is, "Are they right?" I will
argue, first, that Eichenbaum and Singleton are not obviously wrong. It
is not absurd to entertain the notion of monetary neutrality. Second, I
will argue that Eichenbaum and Singleton are not obviously right. In
particular, the failure of money to Granger cause output might not have
implications as far-reaching as they suggest.
Questioning the Non-neutrality of Money
Let me begin with the first issue: Might money be neutral?
To many economists, especially among those who live close to oceans,
the non-neutrality of money is simply common sense. One only needs
to look out at the world or to read the newspaper, I am often told, to
convince oneself that money matters.
I must confess that I am suspicious when one side of a hotly contested
issue lays claim to common sense as an argument. Albert Einstein once
said that "common sense is the collection of prejudices acquired byComment 141
age eighteen." I suspect that Einstein was not talking about the non-
neutrality of money at the time, because if he had been, he likely would
have chosen age twenty-six, when one leaves graduate school. The
thought, however, appears appropriate here.
Many people believe that the stock market exhibits regular patterns
and that they can forecast price movements using these regular patterns.
We call them chartists; they call themselves technical analysts. To these
chartists, the patterns in the stock market are also a matter of common
sense; they have been observing these patterns for years.
Most economists are quick to ridicule chartists; the primary reason is
that there is no firm statistical evidence that chartist techniques are effec-
five. The stock market appears to follow a random walk, or nearly so.
Economists remain unconvinced about the chartists' claims because they
do not hold up against formal hypothesis testing.
Yet if economists are to require that chartism pass the test of formal
inference, our own cherished beliefs must be subject to similar rigor. For
this reason, the empirical results of Eichenbaum and Singleton should
give pause to believers in the non-neutrality of money.
One might argue, and in fact I will, that testing the neutrality of money
is a very difficult task, given the problems of simultaneity. Yet appealing
to common sense and anecdotal evidence does not avoid the identifica-
tion problem. The difficulty of the task should only make economists
less confident about whether money is neutral or not.
Interpreting Granger Causality
I should probably disdose my own prejudices regarding the central
question of this paper. After spending most of my adult years hanging
around Princeton, MiT, and Harvard, I of course see the world through
the lens .of wage and price stickiness. Eichenbaum and Singleton assert
that their results are difficult to reconcile with this sort of model. If so,
much of my human capital would be made obsolete. Let me therefore
turn to the second issue: Do Eichenbaum and Singleton correctly inter-
pret their finding that money does not Granger cause output?
It is now well known that Granger causality has nothing to do with
causality as the term is usually used. My own favorite example is the
permanent income hypothesis, as presented in Hall's 1978 paper. The
model is one in which consumption depends only on current and future
income. Hence,. fluctuations in income "cause" fluctuations in con-
sumption. Yet the theory implies that income does not "Granger cause"
consumption, since changes in consumption are not forecastable. It
would of course be ridiculous to interpret Hall's empirical findings on-w
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Granger causality as evidence that income is not a causal determinant
of consumption.
How, then, can we interpret Eichenbaum and Singleton's finding that
money does not Granger cause output? As the authors are aware, we
cannot jump directly to a cortdusion about actual causality. Instead, they
interpret this finding using the cash-in-advance model presented in the
paper. In the context of this model, if money were important to the path
of economic activity, then money would appear to Granger cause out-
put. They suggest that other popular monetary models would also have
the feature that money should Granger cause output.
It is this last suggestiOn with which I disagree. I suspect that money
need not Granger cause output for money to be a fundamental deter-
minant of output. The following two examples, which are based on a
stylized variant of Fischer's model of nominal wage contracts, illustrate
this possibility.
Suppose that workers sign contracts two periods ahead of the transac-
tion date. That is, at t —2,workers agree on a nominal wage at which
they will sell labor to firms; the contracted wage is of course based on
their expectation of the price level. It is straightforward to show that this
leads to the aggregate supply function:
=a —-2 Ps),(1)
where Y is the log of output and P is the log of the price level. For sim-
plicity, I use the quantity theory of money as my aggregate demand
equation:
+ = P,÷ (2)
where velocityis an exogenous random variable. Equations (1) and (2)
trivially imply that
=J3 —-2M,)+ —E,- (3)
where f3a/(1 +a).
Monetary policy potentially plays an important role in this economy.
But would one find that money Granger caused output? The answer is,
not necessarily, as the following two special cases illustrate:
Example 1: Suppose that velocity is constant, and the money supply
follows an AR(1) process:
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Equation (3) impliesthat
=/3(i's+p- (5)
which in turn implies
(1 + p = (6)
In this economy, the innovation in output and the innovation in money
are perfectly correlated contemporaneously. Past values of money, how-
ever, have no additional explanatory power once we have controlled for
past values of output. That is, -
= ..].
Hence,even though exogenous monetary shocks are the sole driving
force of output fluctuations, money does not Granger cause output.
Example 2: Suppose velocity follows a random walk:
V, = + (7)
implying
=/3 —- + /3+ (8)
Suppose further that the money supply is set one period ahead in an
attempt to stabilize output. Clearly, the Fed cannot offset the demand
shock realized at time t. It can, however, offset the demand shock real-
ized at time I —1.An optimal policy is therefore
Al, =— (9)
which implies that output is
=3e,.(10)
Note that corr(Y,,M,j)= 0for j0, but corr + 0: In this
economy, therefore, money does not Granger cause output, but output
does Granger cause money.
These two examples are highly stylized, and I would not begin to
claim that they well approximate the actual economy. Nor would I claim
that the absence of Granger causality would arise generically in this sort144 MANKIW
of sticky-wage model. These examples do illustrate, however, that the
absence of Granger causality from money to output is not itself sufficient
to conclude that money has not mattered. In both of these examples,
variation in the quantity of money plays an important role for output
fluctuations, yet an observer would fail to detect Granger causality.
One might argue, and correctly so, that in my second example, money
is not an exogenous source of shocks causing output fluctuations. In-
stead, money partly accommodates the exogenous changes in liquidity
preference. This feature of the example is probably not too unrealistic.
During much of the postwar period, the Fed's stated goal was to allow
the money supply to fluctuate in order to stabilize interest rates. My
guess is that during such a regime, the failure of money to Granger cause
output is probably not a problem for standard "saltwater" theories of the
business cycle. That the monetary regime may play a key role in in-
terpreting the results is given some support by Eichenbaum and Single-
ton's finding that money appears to start Granger causing output in the
post-1979 period.
While these two examples convince me that it is not yet time to discard
my prejudice for models with nominal rigidities, the Eichenbaum and
Singleton results do leave me uneasy. To determine more fully whether
their findings provide evidence for real business cycle theories against
Keynesian alternatives, one might consider the following exercise. Take
some clearly Keynesian model, together with empirically plausible reac-
tion functions for the monetary and fiscal authorities. Use the model to
generate forty years of artificial data. Then run the Granger causality
tests on this data. if, as I suspect, one could obtain the Eichenbaum and
Singleton results with this artificial Keynesian data, then one would con-
clude that the absence of Granger causality in the actual data provides no
evidence in favor of real business cycle models.
Unfortunately, I do not have the results from such an experiment to
report. That would be the task of an entirely new paper. It is not even
dear that such a paper could be written, given that there is no model
widely accepted even among Keynesians. I therefore suspect that the ab-
sence of Granger causality from money to output will become another
stylized fact without an obvious interpretation.
In summary, I would like to applaud Eichenbaum and Singleton for ad-
dressing one of the most important and difficult questions dividing mac-
roeconomics today. Their discussion is thoughtful, and their empirical
work is carefully done. My main difference with them is one of inter-
pretation. I doubt that the question of monetary neutrality can be use-
fully addressed by tests of Granger causality.Discussion145
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Discussion
Answering the discussants, Kenneth Singleton commented that policy
may be useful even if the business cycle is an equilibrium real phenome-
non. He agreed with Mankiw that there are ways to reconcile their re-
suits with the belief that money matters. To do this, further work is needed
on the simultaneous modeling and estimation of trends and cydes.
Robert Hall questioned the existence of the extensive intertemporal
substitution associated with real interest rate shocks that is needed in
equilibrium real business cyde theory. He also questioned whether there
was in fact enough persistence in technology shocks to drive observed
serial correlation or persistence in the business cycle.
John Taylor doubted that the importance of oil shocks could be taken
as support for real business cycle models. Prolonged adjustment after
an oil shock is the result of wage stickiness, not of real business cycle
phenomena.
The use of Ml in the empirical investigation was questioned by Law-
rence Summers. First, Ml may not have much to do with aggregate de-
mand. And second, if Ml is used to stabilize future output, then Ml will
not Granger cause output. Summers also remarked that the fact that an-
nouncements about monetary policy have immediate effects on asset
prices is difficult to reconcile with models in which money does not
matter. One of the questions raised by the Eichenbaum-Singleton paper
might be why effects that do occur are so difficult to detect with existing
statistical techniques.
Julio Rotemberg questioned the strong restrictions implied by the use
of the flrst-differenced data. Under the stationarity assumption. even
if money Granger causes output in the level, it will not do so in first
differences.
Lawrence Weiss suggested that causality results might change if quar-
terly rather than monthly data were used. He noted that the data sample146 DISCUSSION
in the Eichenbaum-Singleton paper contains two episodes, 1966 and
1981, in which the Fed is supposed to have caused a recession, and that
these should affect the results. He thought it significant that the stan-
dard models used in macroeconomics imply causal structures with which
the data are inconsistent.
Robert Gordon suggested that Granger causality tests might show that
money Granger causes nominal GNP, even though it might appear not to
Granger cause either real GNP or inflation. Bennett McCailum said that
empirical work in fact typically shows that money Granger causes out-
put. The use of first-differenced data may be the cause of its failure to do
so in the Eichenbaum-Singleton data, for only a small fraction of system-
atic variability may be left in the data after first-differencing. James Stock
agreed, noting that he and Mark Watson had been unable to detect com-
mon variations that exist in level data when using first-differenced or de-
trended data.
Albert Ando pointed out the fragility of Granger causality. Using the
MPS (MIT-Penn-SSRC) model, in which there is a powerful role for
money, he could easily generate data in which money does not Granger
cause output.
Singleton concluded the discussion by stressing the importance of
building models that explicitly include money, in order to be able to de-
tect and evaluate the importance of both monetary and real shocks. The
very fact that it is possible to construct examples of monetary models in
which money does not Granger cause output further highlights the im-
portance of their explicit modeling approach.